1980년대 재일동포 조총련계 상공인의 대북 투자

Abstract

In the late 1970s, North Korea was suffering economic difficulties due to the payable loans and trade costs to the West. To address this challenge, the North Korean regime implemented the Law of Equity Joint Venture, aiming at embracing advanced technology from abroad instead of reform and open-door policies such as that of China. During this period of time, however, the poor condition of the North Korean economy was already known among Korean residents in Japan while the South Korean economy was growing rapidly. Even Korean resident businessmen in Japan recognized challenges of the North Korean including debts to Japan. As it faced difficulties in starting equity joint venture businesses with the West due to financial obligations, the North Korean regime attempted to attract capitals and technologies of Korean resident businessmen in Japan. Against this background, Korean resident businessmen in Japan, who were members of the pro-Pyeongyang federation, took the lead of investment in and trading with North Korea instead of Japanese companies which were passive about trading with North Korea due to its debts. Korean resident businessmen in Japan who belonged to the pro-Pyeongyang federation were motivated by North Korea’s active promotion to invest into it, and they even intended to dominate in investment to North Korea while the amity between North Korea and Japan was being discussed. In particular, Korean resident businessmen in Japan focused on the seeming advantage of starting business with the same people even though they had no sufficient capital or experience for overseas trading. From 1984 to 1989, about 100 equity joint venture businesses were initiated. They invested into various sectors such as light industry, agricultural and marine products, mining industry, and service industry. The total investment amounted to about USD 0.1 billion, and individual investments about 1.15 million. The scale of investment that the North Korean regime desired back then was ten times larger than that of Korean resident businessmen in Japan that belonged to the pro-Pyeongyang federation, and it showed special interest in heavy chemical industry. This indicates that the North Korea regime was not satisfied with equity joint venture investment from small Korean resident businesses in Japan. After all, most of the equity joint venture businesses between North Korea and Korean resident businessmen in Japan ended in failure for quite complicated reasons. In the late 1980s, the North Korean economy was already suffering from shortage of materials and resources as well as the infrastructure including electric power. Besides, the Labor Party seized exclusive power over personnel affairs and work control of equity joint ventures. Arbitrary bureaucracy and non-fulfillment of contracts were also some of the major reasons. In the period of system transformation among the Soviet Union and socialist states in Eastern Europe, the North Korean regime failed carrying forward ‘open-door policies of China’ out of feeling of danger. In addition, loans from public funds for trading with or investment in North Korea such as long-term low-interest loan were available for Korean resident businessmen in Japan, which was one of the reasons of the failure of equity joint venture businesses. Although a small number of Korean resident businessmen in Japan that supported the pro-Pyeongyang federation invested into North Korea with a relatively small amount of capital in consideration of the pool of cheap labor and land, equity joint venture businesses ended up declining in the contradiction of the North Korean system and restraints of international society.