정부관료제의 민주적 책임성: 한국의 제도적 조건에 대한 공간이론적 분석
Democratic Accountability of Government Bureaucracy: A Spatial Model of Institutional Mechanisms in Korea
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초록
이 논문은 통치권력이 수평적으로 분산되어 권력기관 간의 상호 견제와 경쟁이 내재화되어 있는 권력분립 체제의 특성이 행정관료의 결정과 행동에 영향을 미치는 과정을 분석하여 한국 정부관료제의 민주적 책임성을 증진시키거나 제한하는 제도적 기제에 대한이해를 제고하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 일차원의 정책공간에서 권력기관들의 정책선호와상호작용이 형성하는 다양한 조건들에 따라 관료의 민주적 책임성의 정도가 차별화되는과정을 이론적으로 밝힌다. 특히, 우리나라 정부의 제도적 특성을 반영하여 대통령, 국회 및 원내정당의 정책선호, 행정부와 의회의 법안제출 권한, 행정부와 의회의 정책감사등이 관료제에 대한 민주적 통제의 기제로 작동하는 과정을 분석한다.
Abstract
This article contributes to a better understanding of institutionalmechanisms that constrain democratic accountability of governmentbureaucracy in the Korean system of separation-of-powers by analyzinghow interactions among policy-making institutions affect bureaucraticdecisions and actions. It is theoretically revealed that the policy preferenceconfigurations and interactions of the executive and legislative branches ofthe government together constitute various institutional conditions thatdifferentiate the extent to which bureaucrats comply with the wishes ofelected policy-makers. Furthermore, the Korean institutional arrangements,such as the executive and legislative proposal of legislative bills and theexecutive and legislative audits, are found to be key factors of importanceto our understanding of democratic controls over government bureaucracyin Korea.
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