상호저축은행의 소유·지배구조가 경영성과 및 위험도에 미치는 영향
Ownership Structure·Governance, Firm Performance and Risk taking of the Mutual Saving Banks in Korea
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본고는 상호저축은행의 소유·지배구조가 은행의 경영성과와 위험도에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 분석 결과 대주주지분율 50% 이상인 저축은행이 대주주지분율 50% 미만인 저축은행에 비해 수익성 및 운영효율성이 높은 것으로 나타났으며, 법인이 대주주인 저축은행이 개인이 대주주인 저축은행에 비해 운영효율성이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 소유·지배구조가 은행의 위험도에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과, 예상부도확률(EDF)을 종속변수로 한 경우 대주주 지분율이 50% 이상인 은행의 위험도는 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 이상의 분석결과로부터 상호저축은행의 경우 대주주 경영이 갖는 책임경영의 장점과 경영감시 및 견제와 균형의 원리가 경영성과에 긍정적으로 작용한 것으로 풀이된다. 그러나 전문경영인 여부는 상호저축은행의 경영성과나 위험도에 특별한 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 아직까지 상호저축은행의 경우 전문경영인체제가 확립되지 못하였고, 대주주가 존재하는 경우에 있어서 경영자는 대주주가 경영활동에 개입할 것이라고 예상하고 그 결과 경영자의 경영의욕을 감퇴시킨 것으로 해석할 수 있다.
Abstract
Savings bank in korea differs from the commercial banks in that the ownership structure is more concentrated and major shareholder often takes part in the management directly or indirectly. We analyze the effect of ownership structure and governance on the performance and riskiness of the savings banks in Korea, by looking at each cases where the percentage share of major shareholders exceed 50%, where the major shareholders are the corporate entity or individual, or the ownership and management separated. Panel regression methodology is employed. ROA, operating costs and interest margin are employed to measure the bank performance. Various measure of non performing loans are used to measure the riskiness of assets. We find that the banks with concentrated ownership exhibit more robust firm performance with higher profitability and lower costs. On the other hand we observe the positive bank performance when shareholders are corporate entities. The concentrated ownership make low the riskiness of the banks with expected default frequency(EDF). This paper concludes that concentrated ownership of the saving banks in Korea has favorable effect on the bank performance with lower riskiness and conjecture this to be the case due to the responsible management activity taken by the major shareholders. The agency theory does not apply in savings banks where the managers tend to take unprofitable risks.
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