본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

국제금융기구의 ‘이행조건’ 분석과 북한 개발협력 시사점

International Financial Institution ’ s Aid Conditionality and Implications for Development Cooperation with North Korea

0

조회

0

다운로드

1

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

주제분류정치외교학

초록

북한은 김정은 체제 등장 이후에도 ‘비핵화’ 문제로 주변국과의 군사안보적 긴장 관계를 유지하고 있으나, 한국을 포함한 국제사회는 북한의 사회경제적, 정치적 변화에 대한 다양한 시나리오를 준비할 필요가 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 본 연구는 북한에 대한 국제사회의 개발협력이 본격화되기전 주요 의제로 등장할 가능성이 높은 국제금융기구의 ‘이행조건’을 분석하였다. 이를 위해 ‘이행조건’의 정의, 변천 과정, 관련된 주요 쟁점과 정책적논의를 고찰하고, 특히 ‘이행조건’에 대한 비판을 극복하기 위해 최근 국제금융기구들이 강조하고 있는 수원국의 주인의식, 이행조건의 최소화, 국별특성에 부합하는 거버넌스개혁과 기술지원, 국제금융기구 간 협업과 조정, 공여국과 수원국 간 파트너십, 이행조건 수행에 대한 사전⋅사후 명확한합의 등 이행조건 관련 원칙들의 핵심 내용을 정리했다. 또한, 신규 회원국, 체제전환국, 저소득 스트레스 국가(LICUS)에 적용되었던 이행조건들을 사례로 하여, 이행조건의 실제 적용 실태와 문제점, 유형별 특징을 분석함으로써 북한에 대한 시사점을 도출하였다.

Abstract

North Korea has maintained military and security tensions with neighboring countries over the issue of ‘denuclearization’ even after the Kim Jongun regime emerged. However, the international community, including South Korea, needs to consider various scenarios for socioeconomic and political changes in North Korea. In this context, the study sought to analyze the ‘aid conditionality’, which is prerequisite for financial aid to North Korea by international financial institutions(IFIs). To this end, examined were the definition of ‘aid conditionality’, the process of application, related policy discussions and major issues. The present study also analyzed key principles of conditionality proposed by the IFIs such as national ownership, collaborations and coordination among the IFIs, clarification of the conditionality and so on. On top of that, the study investigated the contents of major implementation conditionality such as partnership between donor and recipient countries, willingness and past achievements of recipient countries, cooperation and harmonization between donor countries/organizations. Finally, the implications for North Korea were derived by analyzing the characteristics of these implementation of conditionalities applied to developing countries, transition countries, and low-income stress countries (LICUS).

참고문헌 (64)

  1. Adams, C. S, "Performance-Based Conditionality: A European Perspective", World Development, 32(6), pp.1059~1070 (2004)
  2. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), "Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition" (1999), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
  3. International Monetary Fund, "Guidelines on Conditionality" (2002), Legal and Policy Development and Review Departments
  4. COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY (CAS) Progress Report for the Republic of Columbia, for the period FY03-FY07, "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation", ~ (2005)
  5. International Development Association, Resource Mobilization Department (FRM), "IDA’s performance-based allocation system: a review of the governance factor" (2006)
  6. Kapur, D, "The World Bank: its first half century" (1997), Brookings Institution Press
  7. Koeberle, "Conditionality revisited: Concepts, experiences, and lessons" (2005), World Bank
  8. North, Douglass C, "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance" (1990), Cambridge University Press
  9. 김민주, "원조수혜국의 거버넌스: 원조수혜를 위한 이행조건인가? 선택조건인가?", 한국행정학보, 45(4), pp.253~281 (2011), 한국행정학회
  10. 이한희, "국제금융기구의 대북개발지원의 방향 (국제금융기구의 대북지원계획안 실증분석)", 국제지역연구, 23(2), pp.3~36 (2019), 국제지역연구센터
  11. 임을출, "경제개혁과 이행조건 그리고 공공 거버넌스: 북한 적용 가능성, 함의 및 과제", 통일정책연구, 16(1), pp.53~78 (2007), 통일연구원
  12. 장형수, "북한 개발 지원을 위한 국제협력 방향 : 재원조달 방안을 중심으로", 통일정책연구, 17(1), pp.315~338 (2008), 통일연구원
  13. ADB, "Mainstreaming the Results-Based Lending for Programs" (2019), ADB Policy
  14. Aslund, Anders, "A NewInternational Engagement Framework for North Korea? Contending Perspectives" (2005), Korean Economic Institute
  15. Babson, Bradley O, "A New International Engagement Framework f or North Korea? Contending Perspectives" (2005), Korean Economic Institute
  16. Babson, Bradley O, "Implications of a ‘Bold Switchover’ in Security Policy for Involving the International Financial Institutions in Financing North Korean Economic Development", Paper presented at a conference on “The Regional Economic Implications of North Korean Security Behavior—The ‘Bold Switchover’ Concept (2006), The National Bureau of Asian Research
  17. Banister, G. I, "International Trade and Poverty Alleviation", Finance and Development, 38, pp.48~51 (2001)
  18. Bird, G, "IMF conditionality, implementation and the new political economy of ownership", Comparative Economic Studies, 46(3), pp.423~450 (2004)
  19. Boockmann, B, "The contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to economic freedom", European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), pp.633~649 (2003)
  20. Boone, P, "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid", European Economic Review, 40, pp.289~329 (1996)
  21. "IMF lending programmes: old wolf in sheep’s clothing?"[URL]
  22. Buira, Ariel, "An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development" (2003), United Nations Center for International Development, Harvard University
  23. Campodonico, Humberto, "Conditionality in Latin America", Forum on the Future of Aid (2008)
  24. Chae, Suchan, "Interim Development Assistance for North Korea", Journal of Korean Studies, 6(1), pp.137~149 (2002)
  25. Collier, Paul, "Development Policy Forum" (2004), World Bank
  26. Congressional Research Service, "Foreign Aid Reform Agency Coordination"
  27. Erikson, Daniel P, "Bridging the Gap: IMF and World Bank Membership for Socialist Countries, Cuba in Transition", ASCE (2003)
  28. Department for International Development, "Partnerships for poverty reduction: changing aid conditionality" (2004), Mimeo
  29. The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2002, "Dollar, D", World Bank, ~, pp.Working Paper 3299 (2004)
  30. Dreher, A, "The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality" (2002), HWWA
  31. Dreher, A, "IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality", World Development, 34(5), pp.769~788 (2006)
  32. Dreher, A., "The causes and consequences of IMF conditionality", Emerging Markets, 40(3) (2004)
  33. Easterly, W, "What did structural adjustment adjust. The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans", Journal of Development Economics, 76(1), pp.1~22 (2005)
  34. "EURODAD (European Network on Debt and Development) Submission to the World Bank", IMF 2005 PRS Review 2005, 2005
  35. EURODAD, "Letter on World Bank Conditionality", ~ (2005)
  36. Gunning, J. W, "The reform of aid: Conditionality, selectivity and ownership" (2000), Mimeo CSAE Oxford University
  37. IMF-World Bank, "Strengthening IMF-World Bank collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality" (2001), World Bank
  38. IMF-World Bank, "Strengthening IMF-World Bank collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality- Progress Report" (2002), World Bank
  39. IMF-World Bank, "Strengthening IMF-World Bank collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality– Second Progress Report" (2004), World Bank
  40. International Monetary Fund, "Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05", 52, IMF Executive Board Discusses Review of the Conditionality Guidelines, 2005
  41. Koeberle, S. G, "Should policy-based lending still involve conditionality?", World Bank Research Observer, 18(2), pp.249~273 (2003)
  42. Koeberle, S. G, "Conditionality revisited:concepts, experiences, and lessons" (2005), World Bank
  43. Marchesi, S, "IMF conditionality as a screening device", Economic Journal, 109, pp.111~125 (1999)
  44. 임을출, "북한 개발지원 방향과 전략: 기술지원과 PRSP의 연계", 통일정책연구, 14(2), pp.49~77 (2005), 통일연구원
  45. Mayer, W, "IMF conditionality and the theory of special interest politics", Comparative Economic Studies, 46, pp.400~422 (2002)
  46. Morrissey, O, "Recipient governments’ willingness and ability to meet aid conditionality" (2002), WIDER
  47. Morrissey, O, "Conditionality and aid effectiveness re-evaluated", World Development, 27(2), pp.153~172 (2004)
  48. Mosley, P, "Compliance with World Bank conditionality: implications for the selectivity approach to policy-based lending and the design of conditionality" (2003), CREDIT
  49. Mosley, P, "Aid, poverty reduction and the ‘new conditionality", Economic Journal, 114(496), pp.F217~F243 (2004)
  50. North, Douglass C, "Institutions and economic growth: An historical introduction", World Development, 17(9), pp.1319~1332 (1989)
  51. Oxfam International, "Oxfam International Submission to World Bank Review of Conditionality", ~ (2005)
  52. Oxfam, "From ‘Donorship’ to Ownership? Moving Towards PRSP Round Two", ~ (2004)
  53. Ramón, C. Barquín II, "Comparison of International Monetary Fund and World Bank Conditionalites and Cuba’s Economic Reforms of the 1990s, Cuba in Transition" (1996), ASCE
  54. Svensson, J, "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?", Journal of Development Economics, 70, pp.381~402 (2003)
  55. Thomas, M. A, "Can the World Bank enforce its own conditions?", Development and Change, 35(3), pp.485~497 (2004)
  56. World Bank, "Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences and Lessons" (2005)
  57. World Bank, "Review of World Bank Conditionality: Recent trends and practices operations policy and country services" (2005), World Bank
  58. World Bank, "Evaluation of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS)" (2001)
  59. World Bank, "IDA at Work: Afghanistan: Supporting State-building and Developmen", ~ (2009)
  60. World Bank, "IDA at Work: Haiti: Restoring Hope, Delivering Credibility" (2009)
  61. World Bank, "Operational Policy 8.60"
  62. World Bank, "Review of World Bank Conditionality: 2005 Conditionality Survey Executive Summary and Detailed Results" (2005), World Bank

관련 논문AI추천

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (4건)