일본 정부의 일본군 ‘위안부’에 대한 역사인식과 정책 변화

Abstract

On December 28, 2015, the Korean and Japanese governments reached an agreement on solving the Japanese wartime military sexual slavery issue, which is known euphemistically as the "Comfort Women" issue. Here, the Japanese government admitted the "involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time," and "responsibility" by its government. However, after the agreement, as shown in the international society by denying "forced mobilization" and "sexual slavery," it is unclear what the historical facts are that the Japanese government acknowledged. The purpose of this paper is to review the Japanese government's historical perception and policy changes regarding the "Comfort Women" since 1945 and the defeat of Japan. First, characteristics of the Japanese government's historical perception and policy on the "Comfort Women" are discussed. Fact-finding investigations and compensation measures for victims were discussed separately from the beginning. Not devising measures for compensation based upon the results of investigations, but rather working on the premise that compensation had been solved legally, fact-finding investigations were conducted. Second, during the 1960s, at the government-level the Japanese "Comfort Women" issue was dealt with for the first time not by the victims of war, but by the subjects for the support law. In other words, this matter was dealt with through collaborators for the nation and the war. Third, in terms of the Japanese "Comfort Women" argument, the reason why forcibleness became the core issue is that the "Comfort Women" issue was raised as part of the forced conscription problem from the outset. Additionally, in writing the Kono statement, the reason why Korea, the Japanese government, and civic organizations set their eyes upon this issue was also to determine whether the women were forcibly conscripted or not. Fourth, the change of perception regarding forcibleness is important. Even at that time of the composition of the Kono statement, the Japanese government's position was that there are no documents that prove forced mobilization, though even the media highly appreciated Japanese government admitted forcibleness in a broad sense. However, since then, denying this aspect of the Kono statement highlighted that there are no documents to prove forced mobilization. In proving this, the first Abe Cabinet in 2007 and the second Abe Cabinet in 2013 utilized this as a means to incapacitate the Kono statement. Even with regard to "military involvement," which was admitted in the Korea-Japan Agreement in 2015, the range was reduced to involvement of the military authorities excluding forcibleness. Fifth, such a policy from the Abe cabinet caused criticism in the international community, though the Japanese government argues that such criticism is a result of factual fallacy. Rather, they carry forward with the expansion of such positions toward international society at the policy level.