한국기업의 지배구조, 사업다각화, 기업가치: 패널자료분석법을 응용한 영향 관계분석
Corporate Governance, Business Diversification, and Corporate Value : Korean Evidence from Panel Data
0
조회
0
다운로드
9
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
본 연구에서는 한국의 외환위기 회복 이후기간인 1999년부터 2005년 7개년의 시계열을 갖는 377개 상장기업의 패널자료를 이용하여 기업지배구조와 사업다각화, 기업가치간의 영향관계를 실증적으로 검증하였다. 실증분석결과에 의하면 첫째, 경영진지분율수준이 증가할수록 다각화수준이 증가하는 정(+)의 영향관계가 존재하는 것으로 나타났다. 경영진은 다각화를 통해 경영자 자신의 인적자본의 가치를 방어하고, 개인적 포트폴리오의 위험을 줄이고자 한다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 둘째, 패널 2SLS분석 결과에 의하면 다각화수준과 기업가치의 관계에서 다각화수준이 높을수록 기업가치가 증가하는 정(+)의 영향관계를 발견할 수 있었다. 한국기업의 경우 사업다각화를 통해 내부자본시장을 창출함으로써 효율적으로 자원 할당이 가능하게 되고, 이익창출 사업부문과 손실발생 사업부문간의 손익흐름이 결합되어 세금절감효과를 가져오며, 사업이 집중화된 기업에 비해 부채부담능력이 증가하여 부채에 따른 세금절감효과를 발생시킬 수 있어 기업가치의 증가를 가져올 개연성이 있음을 알 수 있었다. 넷째, 기관투자가지분율이 높을수록 기업가치는 증가하는 것으로 나타나서, 경영자의 대리인문제를 감소시키기 위해서는 기관투자가의 지분율을 지속적으로 확대시켜 나가는 정책이 바람직함을 알 수 있었다.
Abstract
This study conducted an empirical analysis of the effect of Korean companies’ corporate governance structure on business diversification and corporate value, using the panel data analysis method. As the results of analyzing the corporate diversification equation, we could find that the shares of managers had significantly effect on business diversification. This can be explained by the agency cost hypothesis. The results also showed that there is a relationship where the degree of diversification increases as the shares of managers increase, where the management members tend to protect their own human capital and reduce the risk of undiversified personal portfolios through business diversification. As the results of analyzing the corporate value equation, we could not find the effect of business diversification policy on corporate values from panel data analysis. However, the panel 2SLS analysis showed a positive effect relationship where a higher degree of diversification resulted in higher corporate values. Concerning Korean companies, it is probable that a diversified company can create internal capital markets through business diversification, as well as combine earning streams between profit creating segments and loss generating segments, so as to develop the benefits of the tax shield effect, and increase the debt capacity compared with that of business-focused companies.
참고문헌 (45)
- 구맹회, "대리인문제와 사업다각화가 기업가치에 미치는 영향에 관한 실증연구", 재무관리연구, 26(2), pp.1~26 (1999)
- 구맹회, "사업다각화는 기업가치를 감소시키는가?", 증권학회지, 29, pp.215~242 (2001)
- 김병곤, "기업다각화가 기업가치에 미치는 영향: 외환위기 회복 이후기간 패널자료분석", 경영학연구, 34(5), pp.1535~1554 (2005), 한국경영학회
- 김병곤, "패널자료분석법에 의한 기업지배구조와 기업가치간의 영향관계 분석", 금융공학연구, 6(2), pp.223~247 (2007)
- 김병곤, "한국기업의 지배구조가 사업다각화에 미치는 영향: 패널자료로부터의 함의", 금융공학연구, 7(1), pp.95~120 (2008)
- 윤영섭, "사업다각화와 대리인문제가 기업가치에 미치는 영향", 재무연구, 12(1), pp.1~37 (1999)
- Amihud, Yakov, "Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers", Bell Journal of Economics, 12, pp.605~617 (1981)
- Anderson, R. C., "Corporate Governance and firm Diversification", Financial Management, 21, pp.5~22 (2000)
- Baltagi, Badi H., "Econometric Analysis of Panel Data" (1995), John Wiley & Sons, England
- Baysinger, B., "Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effect of Changes in Board Composition", Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1, pp.101~124 (1985)
- Berger, P. G., "Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value", Journal of Financial Economics, 37, pp.39~65 (1995)
- Billet, M. T., "Diversification and the value of internal capital market : The case of tracking stock", Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, pp.1457~1490 (2000)
- Breusch, T., "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its Application to Model Specification in Econometrics", Review of Economic Studies, 47, pp.239~253 (1980)
- Brown, L. D., "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance," Working Paper, Georgia State University", ~ (2004)
- Comment, Robert, "Corporate focus and stock returns", Journal of Financial Economic, 37, pp.67~87 (1995)
- Demsetz, H., "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.375~390 (1983)
- Denis, David J., "Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification", Journal of Finance, 52, pp.135~160 (1997)
- Fama, E. F., "Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88, pp.288~307 (1980)
- Fama, E. F., "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.301~325 (1983)
- Gibbs, P., "Determinants of Corporate Restructuring: Relative importance of Corporate Governance, Takeover Threat, and Free Cash Flow", Strategic Management Journal, 14, pp.51~68 (1993)
- Gompers, Paul A., "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, pp.107~155 (2003)
- Goodstein, J., "The Effects of Board Size and Diversify on Strategic Change", Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp.241~250 (1994)
- Hausman, J. A., "Specification Tests in Econometrics", Econometrica, 46, pp.1251~1272 (1978)
- Hermaelin, B. E., "The Determinants of Board Composition", Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.589~606 (1988)
- Jensen, Michael C., "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers", American Economic Review, 76, pp.323~329 (1986)
- Jensen, M. C., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics, pp.350~360 (1976)
- Johnson, R. A., "Board of Director Involvement in Restructuring: The Effects of Board versus Managerial Controls and Characteristics", Strategic Management Journal, 14, pp.33~50 (1993)
- Lang, L. H. P., "Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance", Journal of Political Economy, 102, pp.1248~1280 (1994)
- Lee, C., "Board Composition and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Management Buyout", Financial Management, 21, pp.58~72 (1992)
- Lewellen, Wilbur G., "A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger", Journal of Finance, 26, pp.521~537 (1971)
- Lewellen, Wilbur G., "Mergers, executive risk reduction, and stockholder wealth", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 24, pp.459~472 (1989)
- Morck, R., "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease? Concentrated Corporate Ownership", pp.319~369 (2000), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
- Rosenstein, S., "Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth", Journal of Financial Economics, 26, pp.175~191 (1990)
- Ross, S., "Corporate Finance" (1993), Irwin
- Rumelt, R., "Diversification Strategy and Profitability", Strategic Management Journal, 3, pp.359~369 (1982)
- Servaes, Henri, "The value of diversification during the conglomerate merger wave", Journal of Finance, 51, pp.1201~1225 (1996)
- Shleifer, Andrei, "Managerial entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments", Journal of Financial Economics, 25, pp.123~139 (1989)
- Singh, M., "Governance and Performance Implications of Diversification Strategies: Evidence from Large U. S. Firm", Financial Review, 39, pp.489~526 (2004)
- Schoar, Antoinette, "Effects of Corporate Diversification on Productivity", Journal of Finance, 57, pp.2379~2403 (2002)
- Stulz, Rene M., "Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control", Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.25~54 (1988)
- Stulz, Rene M., "nagerial discretion and optimal financing policies", Journal of Financial Economics, 26, pp.3~27 (1990)
- Villalonga, B., "Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from BITS Establishment Level Data", Journal of Finance, 59, pp.475~502 (2004)
- Weisbach. M., "Outside Directors and Turnover", Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.431~460 (1988)
- Wernerfelt, B., "Tobin's q and the Importance of Focus in Firm Performance", American Economic Review, 78, pp.246~250 (1988)
- Yermack, D., "Higher Market Value of Companies with a Small Board of Director", Journal of Financial Economics, 40, pp.185~211 (1996)