한국기업의 사업다각화와 대리인문제：잉여현금흐름과 경영자 위험유인을 중심으로
Business Diversification and Agency Problem in Korea: The Consequences of Free Cash Flow and Managerial Risk Incentive
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초록
본 연구에서는 외환위기 회복 이후기간을 대상으로 잉여현금흐름과 경영자 위험유인이 사업다각화에 미치는 영향을 패널자료분석법을 이용해 실증적으로 검증하였다. 실증분석결과는 첫째, 전체기업을 대상으로 분석한 결과에서 재량적 잉여현금흐름가설의 지지여부는 확인할 수 없었으나 경영자 위험회피가설이 지지되는 결과를 확인할 수 있었다. 경영자는 지분율이 높아지면 자신의 다양화되지 않는 재무자산이나 인적자본이 증가하게 되므로 기업의 위험을 축소시키고자 하는 유인을 갖게 되고 이를 위해 사업다각화를 추진하는 것으로 이해할 수 있었다. 둘째, 재벌기업과 비재벌기업 분석에서, 비재벌기업의 경우에는 잉여현금흐름과 사업다각화간에 유의적인 영향관계를 확인할 수 없었지만, 재벌기업의 경우에는 유의한 정(+)의 영향관계를 발견하였다. 재벌기업의 경우 재량적 잉여현금흐름이 많이 창출될수록 투자수익률이 낮은 투자안에까지 과잉투자할 가능성이 높아 대리인문제로 인한 사업다각화가 많이 이루어지는 것으로 이해할 수 있었다. 또한 재벌기업의 경우 경영자 위험회피가설이나 부이전가설의 지지여부를 확인할 수 없었지만, 비재벌기업의 경우에는 경영자 위험회피가설이 지지되는 결과를 확인할 수 있었다. 이러한 결과들은 사업다각화수준을 설명하는데 있어 재벌기업은 재량적 잉여현금흐름가설에 의해 설명이 가능하고, 비재벌기업의 경우 경영자 위험회피가설에 의해 설명이 가능하다는 것을 의미한다. 즉 재벌기업은 재량적 잉여현금흐름이 증가할수록 대리인문제로 인한 사업다각화가 증가하고, 비재벌기업은 경영자의 위험축소 수단으로 사업다각화를 추진하는 것으로 이해할 수 있다.
Abstract
This study analyzes the relationships among free cash flow, managerial risk incentive and business diversification in Korea. A sample of 361 corporations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from 1999 to 2005 is selected. Agency theory suggests business diversification may be dependent on the level of discretionary free cash flow and the percentage of managerial ownership. Agency theory argues that excess discretionary cash may prompt management to make business diversification. Also the theory advances two possible risk-related explanations for the relation between business diversification and managerial ownership. The managerial risk aversion hypothesis predicts a positive relation between managerial ownership and business diversification. The wealth transfer hypothesis predicts a negative relation between managerial ownership and business diversification. We find several interesting empirical results. First, we find that business diversification is positively affected by managerial ownership. The result is consistent with a risk-related agency theory explanation (a managerial risk aversion hypothesis) for business diversification. Second, according to the results of the analysis of Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms, we find that Chaebol firm's business diversification is positively affected by discretionary free cash flow. The result is consistent with the discretionary free cash flow hypothesis for business diversification. Non-Chaebol firm's diversification is positively affected by managerial ownership. The result supports the managerial risk aversion hypothesis.
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