우회상장합병과 일반합병 공시에 따른 합병기업 주주 부 변화의 영향요인

Abstract

This study analyzed merger announcement effect using event study method after selecting 237 merger data of stock-listed corporations that made merger announcement with the Financial Supervisory Service between July 2006 and December 2013 and for which elementary statistical data can be obtained on major variables related to mergers as samples and classifying them into reverse mergers and general mergers. As a result of measuring and analyzing the abnormal returns before and after the announcement of merger, in both the reverse mergers and the general mergers, the existence of merger announcement effect was verified. Univariate analysis and multiple regression analysis were performed on the effects of the types of the merger and the financial characteristics of merging and merged firms on the cumulative abnormal return. Here, samples were divided into the merger samples that are not backdoor listing and the reverse merger samples. Summarizing the results of univariate analysis and regression analysis, in the reverse merger samples, the debt ratio variable had a significant positive(+) effect, the diversifying dummy variable had a significant positive(+) effect, and the affiliated dummy variable had a significant negative(-) effect on the cumulative abnormal return. In the cases of reverse mergers, the increase of the possibility for investment recovery for the existing shareholders of the listed shell firm due to the increase of the number of shares in the market and the transaction amount after the success of the reverse merger is judged to have a positive effect on the increase of the wealth of the shareholders of the shell firm before and after the reverse merger announcement. In the merger samples that are not backdoor listing, the merging firm’s size variable had a significant negative(-) effect on the cumulative abnormal return, and the relative size variable had a significant positive(+) effect, and the merging firm’s share percentage held by the largest shareholder variable had a significant positive(+) effect. This probably suggests that, in the merger samples that are not backdoor listing, the merged firm's relative size to the merging firm and the merging firm’s share percentage held by the largest shareholder have greater positive announcement effects on the market.