一方代理人 法廷 콘테스트와 成功報酬
Unilateral-Delegation Contest and Contingent Fees
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초록
본 논문은 성공보수가 대리인의 법정노력을 효과적으로 통제할 수 있는지, 그리고 당사자의 위험기피도 및 유동성제약이 성공보수의 크기에 어떤 영향을 미치는지를 분석한다. 이를 위해, 피고는 스스로 소송에 임하며 원고는 성공보수로 대리인을 고용하는 일방대리인 법정콘테스트 모형을 설정하고, 대리인은 소송결과와상관없이 고정보수를 지급받으며 승소하면 추가적으로 성공보수를 받는다고 가정한다. 2단계 하부게임 모형을 사용하여, 성공보수와 관련한 다음의 결론이 도출된다. 첫째, 대리인은 승소확률이 일정수준 이상인 사건에 집중하고 그 외의 사건은 비교적 소홀히 대함으로써 승소확률에 따라 법정노력의 수준을 결정하는 전략적 행위를 나타내며, 따라서 성공보수가 대리인의 법정노력을 효과적으로 통제하지 못할 수도 있다. 둘째, 원고의 위험기피도가 높을수록 성공보수가 증가한다. 셋째, 원고의 유동성제약이 성공보수에 미치는 영향은 원고의 위험기피 유형에따라 상이하게 나타난다. 즉, 원고가 위험자산을 열등재로 간주하면 초기부가 클수록 성공보수가 증가하며, 정상재로 간주하면 초기부가 클수록 성공보수가 감소한다.
Abstract
This paper explores how effectively delegates’ legal efforts are controlled by contingent fees, as well as in what manner the size of contingent fees is influenced by the plaintiffs’ liquidity constraints and degree of risk aversion. In our court-contest model, defendants represent themselves while the plaintiffs employ attorneys on a contingent-fee basis. Delegates receive a fixed fee regardless of outcome, with a contingent fee receivable upon winning the case. Results are obtained from a two-stage subgame model as follows. First,delegates show a strategic behavior of concentrating on the cases with higher winning probabilities while treating the rest with relative negligence, thus implying that contingent fees may fall short of remedying the delegates’insufficient legal efforts. Second, higher degree of risk-aversion gives rise to larger contingent fees. Third, in accordance with differing shapes of risk-aversion, plaintiffs’ liquidity constraints manifest opposite influences on the size of contingent fees. That is, plaintiffs’ initial wealth raises contingent fees in case risky assets are an inferior good, while the opposite holds in case of a normal good.
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