객관적 강점이 존재하는 경우의 법정경합
Litigation Contests with Objective Merits of the Case
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본 논문은 소송인들의 객관적 강점이 존재할 때 성공보수와 소송비용 보험 하에서 계약 결정 및 노력투입 결정을 분석한다. 소송인들의 객관적 강점과 판결 시객관적 강점의 반영정도는 소송인들과 대리인들의 전략적 행동에 영향을 줄 수있으므로, 두 제도의 비교 시 이를 함께 고려해야 한다. 본 논문의 연구결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 성공보수 하에서 소송인들의 객관적 강점이 판결 시크게 반영 될수록 성공보수 및 총 노력투입량의 크기는 감소한다. 둘째, 소송비용보험 하에서 소송인들의 객관적 강점이 판결 시 크게 반영 될수록 총 노력투입량의 크기는 감소한다. 셋째, 성공보수 하에서 원고의 기대보수는, 원고의 객관적강점과 판결 시 객관적 강점의 반영정도에 따라 소송비용 보험 하에서의 기대보수 보다
Abstract
We investigate the effect of litigants’ objective merits of the case on litigation outcomes under the contingent fee and the legal expenses insurance regimes. We first demonstrate that the objective merits of the case decreases the amount of contingent fee under the contingent fee regime. Moreover, the higher reflection of the merits on a judgment we have, the lower the total effort levels in both regimes. Next, we provide a condition under which the plaintiff can benefit from the contingent fee regime and vice versa. Finally, we show that the total effort level is always lower in the contingent fee regime.
참고문헌 (28)
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