변호사 보수구조의 戰略的 決定 : 화해를 고려하는 경우
Strategic Decisions on Lawyers’ Compensation Structure : in Consideration of Settlement
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초록
화해를 통한 법정분쟁의 해결을 확대하는 것은 우리나라 사법제도의 합리화를 위한 사법개혁의 일환으로 매우 중요한 의미를 갖는다. 또한 FTA 협상의 진전에 따라 법률 서비스 시장개방이 예상됨으로써 우리나라의 변호사 보수구조에 대한 관심이 증가하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 ‘화해’와 ‘변호사 보수구조’라는 위의 두 가지 화두가 서로 어떤 관계를 갖는지에 대해 집중적으로 분석한다. 화해가 이루어지지 않았다는 가정 하에서 내쉬균형접근법을 통해 소송단계게임의 결과를 유도한 선행연구를 확장하여, 본 연구에서는 화해단계와 소송단계를 아우르는 2단계게임(two-stage game)에서 성공보수 계약 및 시간보수 계약이라는 변호사 보수구조의 두 형태를 비교하여 분석한다. 본 연구의 목적은 보수구조의 선택이 화해의 가능성에 어떠한 영향을 미치며 고소인은 성공보수와 시간보수 계약 중 어느 것을 선호하는가에 대한 답을 구하는 데에 있다. 본 연구의 주요 결론은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 시간보수 뿐 아니라 성공보수 계약에서도, 합리적인 분쟁당사자들은 화해합의에 이르게 된다. 둘째, 고소인은 소송단계에서는 항상 성공보수 계약을 선호하며, 화해단계에서는 시간보수율과 감시비용율의 크기에 따라 성공보수 계약과 시간보수 계약 중 하나를 선호한다.
Abstract
Expanding settlement vis-à-vis litigation of legal conflicts plays a key role in the judicial reform of Korea. In the meantime, recent development towards the trial-centered court system calls for changes in the lawyers’ compensation structure stipulated in the Korean laws. This paper focuses on the relationship between settlement and lawyers’ compensation structure. While the existing literature concentrates on a litigation-stage game through the Nash equilibrium approach, this paper extends it to a dual-stage game encompassing the settlement-stage as well as the litigation-stage. In this context, we also compare the contingent-fee with the hourly-fee contracts, both officially a stranger in the Korean judicial system. The following questions concern us most: which contract more often invites settlements; and which contract finds more favor with the plaintiffs. Key findings are as follows: First, if conditions are met, rational contestants are led to settlement under both contracts. Second, plaintiffs’ preferences for the contingent-fee contract prevail in the litigation stage while varying, in the settlement stage, depending on the relative magnitudes of plaintiffs' vis-à-vis defendants' hourly fees.
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