객관적 강점이 존재하는 경우의 법정경합: 관찰 불가능한 성공보수 계약을 고려하는 경우
Litigation Contests with Objective Merits of the Case: Unobservable Contingent Fee Contract
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본 논문은 소송인들의 객관적 강점이 존재하는 소송상황에서 원고 측 성공보수계약의 공시여부가 성공보수하에서 소송인들의 의사결정에 주는 영향을 분석한다. 또한 이와 같은 소송상황에서 원고 측 성공보수 계약을 피고 측이 관찰할 수없는 경우를 고려해, 성공보수와 법률비용보험하에서 소송의 주요 결과들을 비교해 본다. 먼저 성공보수하에서 원고 측 성공보수 계약의 공시효과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 성공보수 계약의 공시가 이루어지면 성공보수 계약 및 총 노력수준이감소한다. 또한 성공보수 계약의 공시로 인해 소송인들은 더 큰 기대보수를 얻을수 있는 반면, 원고 측 변호인은 더 작은 기대보수를 얻게 된다. 다음으로 성공보수와 법률비용보험의 비교 결과, 경우에 따라 원고는 성공보수를 활용함으로써법률비용보험을 활용하는 경우보다 크거나 작은 기대보수를 얻을 수 있으나, 소송인들의 총 노력수준은 성공보수하에서 항상 낮아진다.
Abstract
We study litigation contests under the contingent fee and the legal expenses insurance regimes when (1) there are objective merits of the case and (2) the contingent fee contract is not observable to the rival party. We first show that the contract disclosure results in lower contingent fee, which decreases the total effort level. As a consequence, the litigants' expected payoffs increase whereas the expected payoff of the plaintiff's lawyer decreases. We next provide a condition under which the plaintiff prefers the legal insurance regime over the contingent fee regime. Finally, we demonstrate that the contingent fee regime always induces a lower total effort level than the legal insurance regime.
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