정권형태와 신흥국가의 시장건설
How important are regime types for building the market in the developing countries?
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초록
신흥국가에서 정권형태와 시장제도의의 인과적 관련성은 제한적이며 조건적이다. 건전한 시장제도의 기초는 제한정부이다. 시장의 기회주의를 처벌할 능력을 보유하면서 동시에 사회세력의 믿을만한 처벌위협으로 인해 권력 남용을 자제하는 제한 정부가 친시장적이다. 이러한 제한정부를 구성하는 데 기여하는 정치제도가 민주주의이다. 민주주의가 다양한 사회구성원의 규범적 합의를 전제할 때 안정적 제한정부가 발생한다. 불행히도 민주주의 도상에 있는 많은 신흥국가는 이러한 기초를 결여하고 있다. 천연자원의 경제적 비중, 국가제도의 발전 정도, 국유재산의 정도 등이 민주성의 정도와 상호작용하면서 신흥국가의 민주화는 제한정부와 전혀 다른 약탈정부를 양산하는 경향이 있다. 사실 독재정권은 일반적인 믿음과 달리 그리 반시장적이지 않다. 독재자와 엘리트의 상호 견제로 인해 상당한 범위 내에서 경제 행위자는 안정적인 재산권을 향유한다. 신흥국가의 발전을 위해서 독재와 민주주의의 이분법 대신 제한 정부를 위한 현실주의적 조건을 마련하는 것이 시급하다고 할 수 있다. 그리고 이를 위해 국제사회의 소규모이지만 신뢰할만한 경제 군사지원이 요구된다.
Abstract
This study examines the causality between regime types and market economies. The foundation of sound market economies is a limited government. The government capacity should be strong enough to punish opportunists in the market, yet limited to be deterred from violating property rights of civil society in order to preserve the market. Democracy is supposed to contribute to building a limited government on the condition that the citizens reach the agreement with what consists of the government violation of limits on its own behavior and share the will to resist the opportunistic state officials. Then a limited government is a self-enforcing equilibrium. Unfortunately, this social consensus is missing in most of the developing countries. Democratization, combined with the degree of rentier economy, state institutional conditions, and the size of state-owned economy, has produced diverse institutional outcomes, which are often opposite to a limited government and devastated the market. On the other hand, the political logic of dictatorship might lead to relatively reliable property rights based upon credible threats of social groups and elites on the dictator. In order to facilitate the formation of a limited government, the international society should commit itself to not only economic but also military support whose cost is unlikely to be high instead of imposing formal constitutional order void of aboriginal contexts.
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