Θηριώδεις καὶ νοσηματώδεις : Comportements contre nature en Éthique à Nicomaque 1148b 15-1149a 20

Abstract

Aristotle describes the three good states of character in terms of virtue, continence and superhuman virtue. In book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics he examines the bad state of character that is opposed to continence (egkráteia), and is therefore termed as incontinence (akrasía). Yet the very meaning of this concept needs to be understood properly, and the Philosopher makes every effort to define precisely what it means to be “incontinent,” and what kind of excess this bad state of character is concerned with. Yet it is obvious that our use of words can be at odds with technical accuracy, and Aristotle takes great pains to take those variations into account so that he can provide us with a general framework that is both precise and likely to account for the way we speak in daily life. Incontinence properly understood has to do with a lack of self-control applied to bodily pleasures such as food and sex. Aristotle then opposes such “plain” incontinence—which is thus concerned with the same objects as temperance (sôphrosúnê) and self-indulgence or licentiousness (akolasía)—to two other kinds of incontinence “by metaphor:” one that has nothing to do with the usual objects of temperance and intemperance on the one side (honor and wealth for example), and one that has to do with bodily pleasures but exceeds the limits of human morality on the other side. That is because when we speak of akrasía we sometimes mean some state of mind that does not fit exactly the definition of “plain” incontinence; and such use has to be accounted for. Hence Aristotle’s terming this broader use of the word as incontinence “by metaphor.”Both kinds of incontinence by metaphor differ thus from each other and from plain incontinence, and are to be investigated in turn. After having dealt with the first kind of incontinence by metaphor in 1147b 20-1148b 14 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle examines the second kind of incontinence by metaphor in 1148b 15-1149a 20—the latter section being the main focus of the present essay. More precisely, this case of incontinence by metaphor is related to incontinence because both concern bodily pleasures, yet it is said to be “by metaphor” owing to the fact that the kind of bodily pleasures it is concerned with are abnormal and inhuman. Hence the cause of such incontinence is described as brutishness or as a state that arises as a result of a disease. The general meaning of the text as a whole is plain, yet difficulties arise when one delves into the details of Aristotle’s explanations, for he approaches the problem from various angles and feels rather free in his use of key concepts of his philosophical vocabulary (especially that of phúsis). The examples he provides are sometimes quite elliptic, and their meaning needs to be elaborated upon so that they can be understood properly. This essay is concerned with the clarification of such details in order to provide the reader of the Nicomachean Ethics with a sound understanding of this section on morally diseased and brutish states. Several commentaries by Greek and Latin interpreters from the Middle Ages (the anonymous Byzantine commentator of Book VII, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas) are examined all the way through, for their own reception of the text helps shed some light on the whole passage. Their comments, together with more recent observations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars, allow us to get a better grasp of both Aristotle’s text and how it was read and understood (or misunderstood) by earlier interpreters.