아리스토텔레스의 자제력 없음과 욕망 간의 갈등

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to reconstruct the problem of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics Ⅶ in terms of two conflicting desires and their corresponding motivational processes. One of the most discussed texts where problem of akrasia is dealt with in the Nicomachean Ethics is the third chapter of its seventh book. Due to the difficulties of identifying the proper examples of akrasia, understanding the meaning of “practical syllogism” and harmonizing arguments through the whole book, the text has brought about a lot of controversy. To find a stable foundation for further discussions over the text, I suggest focusing on a less controversial feature of the phenomenon: an akratic person shows akratic behavior. When the motivational process of akratic behavior is explained, the nature of an akratic agent would be also better understood. Aristotle claims that akrasia is characterized by conflict between rational desire, wish (boulēsis), and non-rational desire, appetite (epithymia). Furthermore in De motu animalium, an actualized desire leads to a corresponding motivational process, which brings about bodily movement. Using this claim as main textual evidence I interpret the conflict between two desires in an akratic person as struggling between two motivational processes, which have a couple of stages. This construction enables us to understand akrasia not only as the defeat of rational desire but also as interrupted rational motivational process by the other competing motivation driven by non-rational desire. One important point, which the investigation into each stage of motivational process reveals, is that one can keep desiring inferior pleasure even when one has completed one’s deliberation (bouleusis). This is because the way in which non-rational desire gets actualized is independent of one’s rational belief. So one of the main questions of this paper is what happens when two motivational processes clash to win the chance to be fulfilled. An enlightening example, the “flute case” in the Nicomachean Ethics Ⅹ, sheds light on the fact that the conflict between motivational processes is resolved when one of them overpowers the other in the magnitude of pleasure, which does not have to imply the total destruction of competing desire or agent’s judgment. In light of the “flute case”, I argue that an akratic agent’s rational desire and judgment about what to do can be kept, even when they fail to bring about corresponding behavior. The reason why rational desire fails to motivate can be explained by the fact that non-rational desire of an akratic agent has a more intense effect on her body than rational desire does. Thus, I conclude that an akratic agent is a person who has been overwhelmed by bodily changes caused by her non-rational desire, which does not necessarily affect existing activities of rational soul.