Aristotle’s Metaphysics E. 2, 1027a19-26: Is Aristotle expressing his view on determinism?

Abstract

This paper discusses a short passage from Aristotle’s Metaphysics E. 2: 1027a19-26. The interpretations of the passage by two modern commentators Ross and Kirwan vary. Ross detects in that passage Aristotle’s inclination to determinism, whereas Kirwan sees no significant claim of Aristotle’s relevant to the issue of determinism. I believe in contrast that Aristotle is expressing his anti-determinism by arguing against a variant of anti-realism regarding accidents. The variant of anti-realism I take Aristotle to consider and finally reject in the passage is the epistemological one. According to this epistemological variant of anti-realism, accidents do not really exist but seem to do so merely because we do not yet fully know what there is to know about them. In other words, the apparent existence of accidents stems from our epistemological limitation. The further our human knowledge develops, the more dwindles the territory of accidents; and, eventually when human knowledge reaches its final stage, there will turn out to be no accident after all. Aristotle, in the brief treatment of this idea in Metaphysics E. 2: 1027a19- 26, denies this epistemological variant of anti-realism regarding accidents. In this interpretation, Aristotle tackles the most fundamental issue concerning accidents, namely whether or not accidents are real, and expresses his realist position and this gives us a reason to believe that Aristotle is against determinism.