사드(THAAD)의 국제정치학: 중첩적 안보 딜레마와 한국의 전략적 대안

Abstract

Current controversies between South Korea and China over THAAD(Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense) are typical security dilemma situations, which lead to either international conflict or cooperation depending on negotiations. THAAD is not a simple bilateral security dilemma between South Korea and China, however, but a more complex security dilemma among South Korea, China, and the United States. In this complex security dilemma, outcomes will differ depending on the parties’ level of concern. Asymmetries among countries will determine choices on the missile defense system. In this paper, we discern the different levels of concern and asymmetrical outcomes for each country. It concludes that South Korea has no choice but to select ‘deployment,’ no matter what pressure China imposes on Seoul not to do so. What should South Korea do?: 1) South Korea should make the United States be more active on this issue since it is an “alliance decision” made by both South Korea and the U.S.; 2) South Korea should not rush ahead with a South Korea-China summit, since it is too costly and the timing is not right: 3) South Korea should not respond emotionally to China’s irrational diplomatic and economic retaliation, even though they are irrelevant and illogical: and therefore, 4) South Korea has no choice but to be patient and wait until the situation calms down, since for South Korea, it is like a ‘deadlock game.’ Moreover, a more serious storm—North Korea’s nuclear and missile problem—is coming. The international politics of THAAD reveals that South Korea faces fundamental strategic choices and questions: 1) How should it deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, which are the basic causes for the THAAD deployment: 2) How should South Korea deal with a changing strategic environment in East Asia resulting from the rise of China? To deal with North Korea’s nuclear problem, first, South Korea should consider the reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis. Second, South Korea should try to revise the U.S.-Korea Missile Guidelines, aiming at abolishing limitations on both missile range and weight. Third, to deal with North Korea’s SLBM, South Korea should develop a nuclear-propelled submarine. Fourth, to fulfill all these defense needs, South Korea should increase defense expenditure to 3% of GDP in the foreseeable future. Finally, to deal with the rise of China, South Korea should pursue ‘a policy of patience and persuasion’ based on a firm U.S.-Korea alliance. Paradigmatic change is occurring in East Asia and South Korea is at its hot spot. THAAD is not only a litmus test for South Korea on whether it will and can survive in this dynamic and complex international strategic situation. It is also a fresh start down the long-road of South Korea’s strategic choices. This study investigates reorganization of the State Oceanic Administration(SOA) to understand changes in China’s maritime law enforcement, Existing literature simply depicts the contents and outcomes of reorganization or focuses on a single restructuring case; this analysis examines the cause, purpose, and process of the restructuring of SOA. Since the SOA, established in 1964, has become the most significant maritime agency in China, key questions include: what kinds of institutional reorganization has it undergone? Why have its roles and functions varied? This study examines official documents of the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese government, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy to unearth the underlying rationale for and processes of reorganization of SOA. The study concludes that SOA, on behalf of the State Council, was controlled by the PLAN in the early period of its establishment, was shifted to the State Scientific and Technological Commission in 1980, and moved again, to the Ministry of Land and Resources of China in 1998. In those early days, China’s maritime resources and maritime security had to be protected and managed by China’s Navy. Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy pushed China to begin to utilize the ocean strategically, resulting in a steady expansion of SOA roles and functions. The strengthened role of SOA led to systematic ocean management and maritime law enforcement. The second and third reorganizations of SOA, which took place in 2008 and 2013, respectively, reinforced its roles and enlarged its scale. During these reorganizations, a decentralized structure was transformed into centralized management mechanism, at the center of which is SOA. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether SOA's tasks have been streamlined, since there remains a dual management structure and internal contradictions.