지방정부發 부정부패의 내생적 매커니즘
The Endogenous Mechanism of Corruption by State Government
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초록
지방정부의 부패 척결에 대한 제도적 해결 방안을 놓고, 이번 논문을 통해 두 가지 개념을 정의했다. 다원 사회의 여러 지역을 대상으로, 중앙정당과 지역정당이 경쟁하는 정당 체제를 수직적 경쟁, 지역정당 간의 경쟁이 활발히 이루어지는 체제를 수평적 경쟁이라고 논했다. 전자의 경우 부패를 근절하고 지방 공공재 생산에 효과적이지만, 후자의 경우 대리인의 지대추구를 위한 공모에 취약하다는 점을 주장했다. 이는 이질적인 성격의 정당이 경쟁할 때 부패를 위한 집단행동이 쉽게 이루어질 수 없다는 점에 기초한다. 그리고 지역별로 다양한 형태의 정당 체제가 발전한 인도는 해당 이론을 시험하기에 좋은 국가가 될 수 있다. 인도의 30개 지역을 대상으로 일원 분산분석을 실시했으며, 결과는 가설과 일치했다.
Abstract
Two concepts are suggested in this paper. In a plural society, the vertical competition which refers to a type of party competition between national and regional parties generates a commitment of the incumbents to produce local public goods. On the other hand, horizontal competition only between regional parties in the absence of vertical monitoring incentivizes the regional agents to coordinate with one another to expand a common pool of rent. It is inspired by the notion that collective action is facilitated under the condition of homogeneity between agents. India is a reasonable case selection to empirically verify the theories. I conduct one-way ANOVA with 30 Indian regions, and the result is consistent to my hypotheses.
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