Can Perceptual Experience Be Both Representational and Relational?
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The representationalist thesis that perceptual experience has content has been recently criticized by a group of philosophers who take perceptual experience to be fundamentally relational. Interestingly enough, some representationalist responses to this criticism are not denying relationalism but trying to reconcile its main theses with their notion of experiential content. In this paper, however, I argue that this compatibilist attempt to reconcile the two views cannot succeed. It will be shown that even the minimal commitments to the notion of experiential content proposed by a compatibilist like Susanna Siegel are still in tension with the core relationalist theses. Then the two views are in fact competing views within a debate of the metaphysical structure of perceptual experience.
Abstract
The representationalist thesis that perceptual experience has content has been recently criticized by a group of philosophers who take perceptual experience to be fundamentally relational. Interestingly enough, some representationalist responses to this criticism are not denying relationalism but trying to reconcile its main theses with their notion of experiential content. In this paper, however, I argue that this compatibilist attempt to reconcile the two views cannot succeed. It will be shown that even the minimal commitments to the notion of experiential content proposed by a compatibilist like Susanna Siegel are still in tension with the core relationalist theses. Then the two views are in fact competing views within a debate of the metaphysical structure of perceptual experience.
참고문헌 (18)
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