Ordinary Objects and Perceptual Evidence
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Among the many contemporary metaphysical debates, one revolves around the existence of ordinary objects. The philosophers, called the eliminativist, argue that there are no ordinary objects as there are no composite objects except for a few. On the other side of the aisle, the conservatives counter this claim by asserting that composition is possible in one way or another, thereby preserving the everyday objects we encounter. Interestingly, both sides of this debate exclude perceptual experience as an obvious judge. It has been a shared consensus that perceptual experience cannot determine the ontological status of ordinary objects. However, this tendency has recently changed due to the work of two philosophers: Alex Byrne and Thomas Hofweber. They have introduced perceptual arguments in favor of the existence of ordinary objects. In this paper, however, I shall argue that both of their arguments fall short. If my argument proves sound, the ontological debate regarding ordinary objects must be resolved through metaphysical arguments.
Abstract
Among the many contemporary metaphysical debates, one revolves around the existence of ordinary objects. The philosophers, called the eliminativist, argue that there are no ordinary objects as there are no composite objects except for a few. On the other side of the aisle, the conservatives counter this claim by asserting that composition is possible in one way or another, thereby preserving the everyday objects we encounter. Interestingly, both sides of this debate exclude perceptual experience as an obvious judge. It has been a shared consensus that perceptual experience cannot determine the ontological status of ordinary objects. However, this tendency has recently changed due to the work of two philosophers: Alex Byrne and Thomas Hofweber. They have introduced perceptual arguments in favor of the existence of ordinary objects. In this paper, however, I shall argue that both of their arguments fall short. If my argument proves sound, the ontological debate regarding ordinary objects must be resolved through metaphysical arguments.
참고문헌 (15)
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