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Abstract

In this paper, I examine some objections and replies to Rawls’ thesis on the compatibility of toleration and neutrality and argue that they are compatible and are needed as a desirable attitude of both states and citizens in pluralistic societies. In section 2, I analyse some objections to Rawls’ thesis. Churchill states that toleration and neutrality cannot be compatible and neutrality instead of toleration is needed to states and citizens. Meckled-Garcia argues that toleration and neutrality are incompatible, because toleration is that the relevant agent has a first order reason to repress a view or a practise and acts on a second order reason not to repress it, while neutrality, by contrast, is to forgive the first order reason to repress it. In section 3, I analyse some replies to those objections. Jones argues that the reason for toleration is not second order reason but first order one and neutrality dose not forgive the first order reason for toleration. Smith states that neutrality brings about the impoverishment of the soul and the discourse by separating persons not only from states but also from citizens. In section 4, I analyse an alternative and a extensions of the concept of toleration. Meckled-Garcia proposes a concept of acceptance as an alternative of the concept of toleration. But, Galleotti criticizes the concept of acceptance and proposes the concept of toleration as recognition as a extension of the traditional concept of it. I argue that toleration as recognition is compatible with neutrality and have a similar meaning with an attitude of engagement which Rawls’ toleration calls for.