문재인 정부 검찰개혁에 대한 평가

Abstract

This article aims to evaluate the prosecution reform of Moon Jae-In government. This reform is carried out as part of rearrangement plan of “power organizations”, that is, the police, the prosecution, and the National Intelligence Service(NIS). In this context, the so-called ‘Three Bills on Prosecution Reform’ went through the National Assembly in 2020. With the revisions of ‘Prosecutors' Office Act’ and ‘Criminal Procedure Act’, and the enactment of ‘Act on the Establishment and Operation of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials’(CIO), the prosecutors’ authority to direct and supervise police investigations was abolished, the independent investigative authorities of the Police were granted, and the scope of direct initiation of prosecutorial investigations was considerably reduced. In addition, CIO was established as an independent investigative body with limited authorities to institute and maintain prosecutions of the specific corruption crimes committed only by judges, prosecutors and high-ranking police officers. The legislative and administrative changes as results of this reform are noteworthy. However, the original conception of “separation and distribution of the prosecutors’ power” and “checks-and-balances among ‘power organization’” has not been fully accomplished in the actual process of legislation. First of all, the prosecution still has broad authority to directly initiate the investigation and keeps the number of investigation officials in Prosecutors’ Office supporting this prosecutorial investigation at the same level as before. Secondly, the authorities of the police have been extended significantly, while the prosecution’s not being so substantially reduced. Finally, the prosecutors of the Prosecutors' Office still have overwhelming positions in criminal procedure, especially in prosecuting criminal cases, since CIO has very limited authorities in prosecution. The prosecution reform of Moon Jae-In government, at its initial stage, was based on the notion that the prosecution's direct investigative authorities would be maintained. This was not inconsistent with the strategy of the Prosecutor's Office to strengthen the ‘specialized investigation’. Recently the government confronts strong opposition of the prosecution, when it comes to discussing the reduction of investigation officials in Prosecutors’ Office. This shows that the prosecution reform has now entered its core area and that it is necessary to abide by the original ideas of the prosecution reform, in other words, the idea of the separation of the investigation and the prosecution to prevent the prosecutors from abusing their authorities. At this point, in order for prosecution reform to go one step further, it seems urgent to take measures to reduce the prosecutors’ authority to directly initiate investigation and the investigation officials in Prosecutors’ Office.