Is Victory Enough? The Complementary Effects of the Economy and War Outcome on Postwar Leader Survival
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Which matters more to a democratic leader seeking to stay in power: Success in the economy or success in foreign policy? When a leader wins a war and manages the economy well, such successes not only confirm the competence of a leader to the public but also boost his/her political future. The war outcome and the economy are, thus, complementary signals of leader competence to the public. However, which one matters more? To test this, a series of the Cox proportional hazard model are employed. The data set, Archigos, includes key information on political leaders. The data analysis covers 2049 leaders of 166 countries during the period between 1919 and 1999. I find that while victory in war and the good economy at home contribute positively to the duration of postwar tenure, victory and the economy at are complementary signals of leader competency to the public. Thus, to democratic leaders victory alone is not beneficial unless they succeed in managing the economy at home as well. This, thus, suggests that the economy at home is a more dominant signal of leader competence to victorious leaders.
Abstract
Which matters more to a democratic leader seeking to stay in power: Success in the economy or success in foreign policy? When a leader wins a war and manages the economy well, such successes not only confirm the competence of a leader to the public but also boost his/her political future. The war outcome and the economy are, thus, complementary signals of leader competence to the public. However, which one matters more? To test this, a series of the Cox proportional hazard model are employed. The data set, Archigos, includes key information on political leaders. The data analysis covers 2049 leaders of 166 countries during the period between 1919 and 1999. I find that while victory in war and the good economy at home contribute positively to the duration of postwar tenure, victory and the economy at are complementary signals of leader competency to the public. Thus, to democratic leaders victory alone is not beneficial unless they succeed in managing the economy at home as well. This, thus, suggests that the economy at home is a more dominant signal of leader competence to victorious leaders.
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