미국의회 소위원회제도의 역사적 변천과 그 정치적 동학
Political Dynamics behind Historical Changes in the U.S. Congressional Subcommittee System
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This article aims to answer why the U.S. congressional subcommittee system has experienced such rapid and massive ups-and-downs in its historical development. Noting the limitation of a functionalist explanation, this article highlights dynamics of party politics as a crucial factor driving the volatile historical changes in the U.S. congressional subcommittee system. Discussion starts from a broad sketch of those historical changes (Section II): in terms of number, activities, and legislative importance, subcommittees reached their heydays in the 1970’s thanks to a series of institutional reform, but suffered a significant setback in the wake of the Republican electoral victory in 1994. A functionalist perspective does not fully explain these historical fluctuations in the power of subcommittees. Section III, in this vein, reviews the literature and theoretically hypothesizes that partisan interests and motivations can work to aggrandize the presence and power of subcommittees or, depending on political situations, rather weaken them. This political explanation is empirically supported in Section IV with the two noteworthy historical cases: the early 1970’s reforms, including the 1973 Subcommittee Bill of Rights, as a case demonstrating party dynamics behind a rapid strengthening of subcommittees, and the mid 1990’s reforms, led by Speaker Gingrich, as a contrary case showing partisan influences on a large-scale reduction in subcommittee powers. Lastly, Section V reiterates a lesson: success of the subcommittee system heavily depends on a delicate balance between unity and diversity in party politics.
Abstract
This article aims to answer why the U.S. congressional subcommittee system has experienced such rapid and massive ups-and-downs in its historical development. Noting the limitation of a functionalist explanation, this article highlights dynamics of party politics as a crucial factor driving the volatile historical changes in the U.S. congressional subcommittee system. Discussion starts from a broad sketch of those historical changes (Section II): in terms of number, activities, and legislative importance, subcommittees reached their heydays in the 1970’s thanks to a series of institutional reform, but suffered a significant setback in the wake of the Republican electoral victory in 1994. A functionalist perspective does not fully explain these historical fluctuations in the power of subcommittees. Section III, in this vein, reviews the literature and theoretically hypothesizes that partisan interests and motivations can work to aggrandize the presence and power of subcommittees or, depending on political situations, rather weaken them. This political explanation is empirically supported in Section IV with the two noteworthy historical cases: the early 1970’s reforms, including the 1973 Subcommittee Bill of Rights, as a case demonstrating party dynamics behind a rapid strengthening of subcommittees, and the mid 1990’s reforms, led by Speaker Gingrich, as a contrary case showing partisan influences on a large-scale reduction in subcommittee powers. Lastly, Section V reiterates a lesson: success of the subcommittee system heavily depends on a delicate balance between unity and diversity in party politics.
참고문헌 (35)
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