니코마코스 윤리학의 행복

Abstract

The putative inconsistency in understanding the nature of happiness given by Aristotle enables us to ask the question "Can Aristotle's accounts of happiness fit together into a consistent account?" The central aim of this paper is to defend Aristotle against the claim that, throughout Nicomachean Ethics (NE), his accounts of happiness are inconsistent by presenting one alternative interpretation that NE employs the inclusive view of happiness. To do this, we will try to argue that Book I and Book X support the inclusive view of happiness - at least when the text is properly interpreted - by saying that Aristotle consistently adheres to the inclusive view of happiness which shows that it includes all complete goods. Our use of the term "implicitly inclusive" is somewhat controversial because there are two levels, explicit and implicit, in both NE I and NE X. In NE I, the account of happiness is exclusive on explicit level, and inclusive on implicit level. However, our idea is that, (A) although there are some explicit levels of the inclusive view, namely, the introductory juncture and the self-sufficiency passage, in NE I, NE I as a whole is implicitly inclusive because implicit level makes those explicit levels implicit and thus NE I is regarded as holding the implicitly inclusive view within whole picture, and (B) a reading of NE X that takes the explicitly exclusive reading is too simplistic, so that a proper understanding as applied to humans, would see that happiness really is inclusive in NE X, even if in implicit level. On the basis of this idea, we will conclude that the two accounts of happiness given in NE I and X are consistently and implicitly inclusive, although in different ways. Thus, if our alternative interpretation would succeed, then, on this basis, we hold that his accounts of happiness can fit together into a consistent account.