중심성 가정과 직관 부정자들

Abstract

In the 21st century, there has been a sudden surge of inquiry into the nature and role of intuition in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers have begun to explore issues such as what intuition is, how it should be defended, what role it plays in philosophy, and what its epistemic status is. This interest in intuition stems from the realization and appraisal that analytic philosophers often appeal to intuition in the development of their philosophical theories. So, recently, analytic philosophers have tended to think that their philosophical theories are ultimately grounded in intuition, and that philosophy essentially depends on intuition. So, some say that “the practice of appealing to intuitive judgments . . is a long-standing standard in analytic philosophy,” while others call intuition “the standard justificatory procedure in analytic philosophy.” Thus, many analytic philosophers today place great emphasis on the role of intuition in philosophy and have accepted that it plays a central role in analytic philosophy. So, they consider intuition to be an important source of evidence for their theories. They contend that the standard methodological tenets that appeal to intuition are acceptable, even essential, tools for revealing philosophical truths. So, they rely centrally on intuition as a source of evidence, or evidence itself, for their philosophical theories. In this sense, they can be called intuition supporters, and many traditional analytic philosophers fall into this category. On the other hand, there are philosophers who recognize that intuition is used as evidence in philosophy but take a critical stance towards it. Some experimental philosophers, in particular, are critical of intuition because it can vary depending on irrelevant factors such as sociocultural background, race, gender, and the order in which cases are presented. So they argue that intuition is epistemically valueless in philosophy, or at least in complex situations. And in this sense, they are critical of intuition as a standard philosophical methodology, and can be called intuition critics. Meanwhile, however, a few contrary souls have opted for a third response to the intuition question. Some philosophers, though in the minority, criticize the views of both intuition supporters and intuition critics. They reject the centrality assumption that “philosophers rely on intuition as evidence for philosophical theories.” According to them, philosophers generally do not use intuition as evidence in the first place. So they believe that both intuition critics or intuition supporters are both wrong. And in this sense, they can be called intuition deniers. The purpose of this paper is to understand and examine the basic position of intuition deniers, who constitute a minority alongside both intuition supporters and critics. It will try to understand the position of the intuition deniers who deny the centrality of intuition, especially through the views of H. Cappelen, T. Williamson, and M. Deutsch. To do so, we briefly introduce their views as intuition deniers, and then introduce and examine the three arguments that underlie this view: the argument from unclear application, the argument from anti-psychologism, and the argument from argumentationalism. After examining these arguments, we then look ahead to the tasks of intuition theorists.