대형금융기관(금융지주회사)의 도산처리 방향 - 금융안정위원회(FSB)의 권고안을 중심으로 -
How can we treat Systemically Important Financial Institutions' bankruptcy?
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In the summer of 2011, nearly four years after a downturn began, the economies of the United States and the countries of Europe continue to struggle and markets were roiled by fears of new setbacks, defaults and the possibility of a double-dip recession. Since the fall of 2009, the European Union has been struggling with a slow-moving but unshakable crisis over the enormous debts faced by its weakest economies, such as Greece and Portugal, or those most battered by the global recession, like Ireland. Financial Institution failures are widely perceived to have greater adverse effects on the economy and thus are considered more important than the failure of other types of business firms. Lehman's collapse was a decisive moment in the crisis. The U.S. government's decision not to bail out the firm set off a near panic among investors and lenders world-wide, forcing the U.S. to push through a historic rescue plan for the financial system. The disorderly collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 provided a sharp and painful lesson of the costs to the financial system and the global economy of the absence of powers and tools for dealing with the failure of a SIFIs(Systmically Important Financial Institutions). The G20 Leaders asked the FSB(The Financial Stability Board) to set out more effective arrangements for resolution of SIFIs. As part of the response to the G20Leaders, the FSB have put forth proposals that would require national authorities to consider restructuring mechanisms to allow recapitalisation of a financial institution as a going concern by way of contractual and/or statutory debt-equity conversion and write-down tools, as appropriate to their legal frameworks and market capacity. As a market-oriented mechanism, contingent capital is supposed to provide financial institutions leverage in good times and capital buffer in bad times. It directly addresses many of the problems related to moral hazard and market discipline. And also FSB recommend to authorities that the policy framework for SIFIs should combine a resolution framework and other measures to ensure that all financial institutions can be resolved safely, quickly and without destabilising the financial system and exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss. It also showed there was a need for such institutions to be better prepared to recover from situations of severe stress through Recovery and Resolution Plans. The response to FSB consultative document, the Korean Financial Services Commission(FSC) has proposed the change of financial investment services and capital market act including bail-in powers within resolution. In addition to the proposal of financial investment services and capital market act, I strongly recommend the change of act on the structural improvement of the financial industry to follow FSB recommendation.
Abstract
In the summer of 2011, nearly four years after a downturn began, the economies of the United States and the countries of Europe continue to struggle and markets were roiled by fears of new setbacks, defaults and the possibility of a double-dip recession. Since the fall of 2009, the European Union has been struggling with a slow-moving but unshakable crisis over the enormous debts faced by its weakest economies, such as Greece and Portugal, or those most battered by the global recession, like Ireland. Financial Institution failures are widely perceived to have greater adverse effects on the economy and thus are considered more important than the failure of other types of business firms. Lehman's collapse was a decisive moment in the crisis. The U.S. government's decision not to bail out the firm set off a near panic among investors and lenders world-wide, forcing the U.S. to push through a historic rescue plan for the financial system. The disorderly collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 provided a sharp and painful lesson of the costs to the financial system and the global economy of the absence of powers and tools for dealing with the failure of a SIFIs(Systmically Important Financial Institutions). The G20 Leaders asked the FSB(The Financial Stability Board) to set out more effective arrangements for resolution of SIFIs. As part of the response to the G20Leaders, the FSB have put forth proposals that would require national authorities to consider restructuring mechanisms to allow recapitalisation of a financial institution as a going concern by way of contractual and/or statutory debt-equity conversion and write-down tools, as appropriate to their legal frameworks and market capacity. As a market-oriented mechanism, contingent capital is supposed to provide financial institutions leverage in good times and capital buffer in bad times. It directly addresses many of the problems related to moral hazard and market discipline. And also FSB recommend to authorities that the policy framework for SIFIs should combine a resolution framework and other measures to ensure that all financial institutions can be resolved safely, quickly and without destabilising the financial system and exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss. It also showed there was a need for such institutions to be better prepared to recover from situations of severe stress through Recovery and Resolution Plans. The response to FSB consultative document, the Korean Financial Services Commission(FSC) has proposed the change of financial investment services and capital market act including bail-in powers within resolution. In addition to the proposal of financial investment services and capital market act, I strongly recommend the change of act on the structural improvement of the financial industry to follow FSB recommendation.
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