금융기관의 파산으로 인한 시스템 리스크의 발생에 관한 법률적 규제- 미국의 파산과 구제금융의 규제를 중심으로 -
Legal Perspectives on Failures of Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk Regulation - The US Regulations on Bankruptcy or Bail-out -
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The systemic risk regulation is a key measure for the safe and sound financial system and the prudential bank supervision. The goal of any financial regulatory system should be to enable well-functioning markets. Meeting this goal requires reducing the impact and frequency of financial institution failures that cause systemic risk. Any regulatory structure, however, inevitably involves tradeoffs. A policy that effectively reduces systemic risk and its associated costs might also increase moral hazard. Similarly, a policy that seeks to reduce moral hazard and maintain market discipline - for example, by allowing a large interconnected institution such as Lehman Brothers to fail - might also create uncertainty, which can harm markets by creating panic. In some parts, current regulatory structures in Korea and the U.S. are suboptimal in their regulations of the systemic risk. In the U.S. the federal government could strike a superior balance by establishing more stringent ex ante prudential regulations of systemically important non-bank financial institutions aimed at curbing excessive risk-taking and by implementing a regulatory process to resolve the failure of such institutions. The Dod-Frank Act by the Obama Administration has adopted regulatory reform that endorses such beneficial changes, but certain details in the proposal fall short. In Korea, it seems that the reforming financial regulations with respect to a systemic risk is required for troubled banks and non-banking institutions due to the shortcomings of our current regulatory structure and the ad hoc approach to rescuing TBTF non-bank financial institutions. A regulatory framework that more effectively contains systemic risk, avoids increasing moral hazard, and reduces excessive uncertainty caused by regulation. In this regards, it is noted that Korea should seek to optimize the ability to reduce systemic risk while minimizing the counterproductive results of moral hazard and uncertainty.
Abstract
The systemic risk regulation is a key measure for the safe and sound financial system and the prudential bank supervision. The goal of any financial regulatory system should be to enable well-functioning markets. Meeting this goal requires reducing the impact and frequency of financial institution failures that cause systemic risk. Any regulatory structure, however, inevitably involves tradeoffs. A policy that effectively reduces systemic risk and its associated costs might also increase moral hazard. Similarly, a policy that seeks to reduce moral hazard and maintain market discipline - for example, by allowing a large interconnected institution such as Lehman Brothers to fail - might also create uncertainty, which can harm markets by creating panic. In some parts, current regulatory structures in Korea and the U.S. are suboptimal in their regulations of the systemic risk. In the U.S. the federal government could strike a superior balance by establishing more stringent ex ante prudential regulations of systemically important non-bank financial institutions aimed at curbing excessive risk-taking and by implementing a regulatory process to resolve the failure of such institutions. The Dod-Frank Act by the Obama Administration has adopted regulatory reform that endorses such beneficial changes, but certain details in the proposal fall short. In Korea, it seems that the reforming financial regulations with respect to a systemic risk is required for troubled banks and non-banking institutions due to the shortcomings of our current regulatory structure and the ad hoc approach to rescuing TBTF non-bank financial institutions. A regulatory framework that more effectively contains systemic risk, avoids increasing moral hazard, and reduces excessive uncertainty caused by regulation. In this regards, it is noted that Korea should seek to optimize the ability to reduce systemic risk while minimizing the counterproductive results of moral hazard and uncertainty.
참고문헌 (55)
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