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Loosening or Tightening the Linchpin? The Effects of China’s Approach to US THAAD Deployment in South Korea

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국제학연구소 (The Keimyung Institute for International Studies)|2022.06|Journal of International and Area Studies|제29권 제1호|pp. 1-20|DOI 10.23071/jias.2022.29.1.1

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참고문헌

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South KoreadiscourseTerminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)ROK–China relationsROK– US alliance
주제분류정치외교학

초록

China’s coercive response to the 2016 deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea has been dubbed as its attempt to “loosen the linchpin” of the ROK–US alliance. By reviewing the post-THAAD changes in South Korea’s THAAD deployment and strategic debates in the domestic sphere, this paper seeks to study the effects of China’s coercion on South Korea’s security choices. This paper is structured in two parts: First, how and to what extent has China’s coercion caused procedural changes in the THAAD-related decision-making process, policy content, and the ultimate change in the decision on THAAD? Second, how have key actors’ overall perceptions and rhetoric about China changed after the THAAD turmoil? The main findings of this study suggest that China’s coercion has caused a hardening than “loosening” of the security linchpin of the ROK-US alliance.

Abstract

China’s coercive response to the 2016 deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea has been dubbed as its attempt to “loosen the linchpin” of the ROK–US alliance. By reviewing the post-THAAD changes in South Korea’s THAAD deployment and strategic debates in the domestic sphere, this paper seeks to study the effects of China’s coercion on South Korea’s security choices. This paper is structured in two parts: First, how and to what extent has China’s coercion caused procedural changes in the THAAD-related decision-making process, policy content, and the ultimate change in the decision on THAAD? Second, how have key actors’ overall perceptions and rhetoric about China changed after the THAAD turmoil? The main findings of this study suggest that China’s coercion has caused a hardening than “loosening” of the security linchpin of the ROK-US alliance.

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