북한의 핵 미사일 위협에 대한 일본의 군사 외교적 대응

Abstract

In response to nuclear-armed North Korea, Japan has taken extensive non-nuclear military measures in order to cope with the North Korean threat while being less active in using diplomacy. Analysts estimate that North Korea had possessed 33 to 55 kilograms of plutonium enough for 6 to 13 nuclear devices. Two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 proved that North Korea had successfully produced nuclear devices. The only remaining missing link in determining whether North Korea’s nuclear weapons have become usable is in the issue of miniaturization. On this point, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) assessed in 2009 that North Korea “may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.”Capable of covering almost the entire territory of Japan, the medium-range No Dong missile constitutes the most serious threat to the country. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 kilometers with a payload of 700 to 1,200 kilograms and circular error probable(CEP) of 2.5 kilometers. By 2003, North Korea had deployed some 175∼200 No Dong missiles. A more recent report stated that as many as 320 No Dong missiles had been deployed. As a result, North Korea is already capable of attacking Japan with ballistic missiles. Conventional, chemical, or biological weapons can be used. Given the DIA’s estimate of North Korea’s ability to miniaturize the nuclear device, the assessment is that North Korea “may be able to” now use nuclear weapons against Japan. There are three scenarios in which North Korea might actually use missiles against Japan. First, there is a military-diplomatic scenario in which North Korea would launch missiles as a part of its effort to coerce Japan into diplomatic submission. Second, there is a wartime deterrence scenario in which North Korea would use or threaten to attack Japan in order to deter the United States and Japan from assisting South Korea in case of war on the Korean peninsula. Finally, there is a scenario in which desperate North Korean leaders launch all-out attacks against Japan. Japan’s military response to the North Korean threat has three pillars: ballistic missile defense(BMD), civil defense, and extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States. In 2003, the Japanese government made the decision to procure BMD systems. Based on this decision, deployment of BMD units in the Self-Defense Forces(SDF) began in 2007, and the deployment was completed in 2012. Two different systems are being introduced as key components of the Japanese BMD measures. One is the Standard Missile-3(SM-3) Block IA, an upper-tier, mid-course defense system deployed on Aegis destroyers. The other system is Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3(PAC-3), a ground-based, lower-tier, terminal-phase defense system. Of these two systems, the Aegis-based SM-3 is more important than PAC-3 in the sense that the SM-3 has much wider area coverage. The total expenditure of procuring the entire system is approximately 1 trillion yen, or $12.2 billion. Regarding civil defense measures, the Civil Protection Law was enacted in 2004. It stipulated how the national and local governments should implement evacuation and relief operations and take necessary measures in response to armed attacks. In 2005, the Cabinet Secretariat prepared a new warning siren designed specifically for civil defense purposes. Japan has taken steps to maintain and possibly enhance the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The Nuclear Posture Review(NPR) published by the Department of Defense in April 2010, however, announced that the Tomahawk, nuclear-equipped, sea-launched cruise missile(TLAM-N) would be retired. Some Japanese government officials felt betrayed by this since the TLAM-N had long been hailed as the centerpiece of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent provided to Japan. One of the basic assumptions in Japan’s diplomatic approach to North Korea is that the country’s most important policy objective is regime survival by way of defying military/diplomatic pressure from outside, normalizing relations with the United States and Japan, and obtaining economic assistance from the outside. In this context, Japan offered normalization of bilateral relations and provision of significant economic assistance in the September 2002 Pyongyang Declaration on the condition that North Korea properly addressed nuclear as well as other issues of Japanese concern. When North Korea informed Tokyo that many of the Japanese abductees had died and presented fake death certificates, however, the Japanese general public was outraged. Since then, the abduction issue has become a big political issue and the Japanese government has had no alternative but to take a tough position toward the North.