‘북방한계선’ 논란, 무엇이 문제인가?

Abstract

The Northern Limit Line(NLL) was drawn unilaterally by the United Nations Command(UNC) on August 30, 1953, 34 days after the armistice of the Korean War that had gone into effect on July 27 without military demarcation lines(MDLs) drawn on the seas east and west of the peninsula. However, substituting the MDL in the militarily sensitive zone of the West Sea of the Korean Peninsula, the unilateral UNC measure quickly secured its relevance as an integral element of the Korean War armistice regime as it effectively filled up the critical vacuum created by the failure of the Armistice Agreement of 1953 to draw MDLs separating the two belligerent parties on the seas east and west of the peninsula. For twenty years, between 1953 and 1973, North Korea did not take any action challenging the efficacy of the NLL. Instead, North Korea left numerous footprints during the twenty-year period that showed Pyongyang not only acknowledging but also recognizing, if not accepting as well, the existence and validity of the NLL, allowing it effectively to function as a boundary line dividing the seas east and west of the peninsula into two zones controlled respectively by the two sides of Korea. It was in 1973, however, when North Korea began mounting concerted diplomatic as well as military moves challenging the validity of the NLL. The NLL was raised by Pyongyang as one of the main issues for negotiation at the inter-Korean prime ministerial talks, the ‘North-South High-level Talks’ by calling, in the early years of 1990s, as North Korea, holding that the NLL allegedly lacked in legitimacy having been drawn unilaterally by the UNC without North Korea’s consent, demanded that a “new maritime demarcation line” of North Korea’s own drawing be accepted by South Korea in the West Sea to replace the NLL. North Korea failed, however, to prevail at the inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks on this issue as the two sides agreed in Article 11 of the “North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation” (“North-South Basic Agreement” by abbreviation) that had gone into effect as of February 19, 1992, that the two sides would “continue to honor the military demarcation line stipulated by the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the zones controlled heretofore by the two sides respectively as the boundary line and zones of non-aggression.” By accepting this article in the Basic Agreement, North Korea has left it indisputable that, at least for the time being, Pyongyang was accepting the NLL as the line that divided the seas into two “zones.”North Korea renewed, at the ensuing round of the inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks held later in September 1992, its attempt to draw a new maritime military demarcation line to replace the NLL through agreement between the two Koreas. However, the renewed North Korean attempt was thwarted again as it was found to be grossly in conflict with Article 5 of the Basic Agreement under which the two sides were bound by agreement that, while they would “jointly endeavor to have the current state of armistice replaced by a state of permanent peace,” they would “continue to abide by the current Armistice Agreement until the time when such a state of permanent peace is realized.”As the Northern demand that a “new maritime MDL” be drawn on the West Sea was tantamount to amending the Armistice Agreement of 1953, it was expressly not an issue that, under Article 61 of the Armistice Agreement, the two Koreas were authorized to deal with between them. With the two Koreas having agreed in the Basic Agreement(Article 5) to “continue to abide by the current Armistice Agreement until it was replaced by a state of permanent peace,” it was indisputable that the two Koreas were not authorized to draw a new MDL through agreement between them as long as the Armistice Agreement remained in force pending “institutionalization of a state of permanent peace” through conclusion of a peace treaty that would replace the Armistice Agreement. Article 10 of the ‘Appendant Protocol to the Basic Agreement on Military Matters’ that, having gone into effect as of September 17, 1992, allows the two Koreas to “continue to discuss the issue of line of non-aggression on the seas, while accepting the existing zones of seas controlled respectively by the two sides” does not amount to allowing them to undertake any negotiation on the issue as long as the Armistice Agreement is still being observed. Under Article 5 of the Basic Agreement, the “inter-Korean discussion on the line of non-aggression on the seas” stipulated in Article 10 of the ‘Appendant Protocol’ is something that can take place only after the Armistice Agreement is replaced by an “institutionalized state of permanent peace.”While there are two circumstances that warrant an “institutionalized state of peace” on the Korean peninsula, either unification or conclusion of a permanent peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement, it is obvious that a “unified Korea” would not necessitate a “line of non-aggression.” Consequently, it is obvious that “inter-Korean discussion on the issue of a line of non-aggression” between them under Article 10 of the “Appendant Protocol” is something that can take place only as part of a discussion on the issue of a peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement.