Rethinking Economic Sanctions on North Korea: Success Factors of the Sanction on BDA
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What are the success factors of the sanction against Banco Delta Asia (BDA)? In 2005, the US Department of Treasury sanctioned BDA for alleged money laundering related with the North Korean regime. Although the executed sanction complicated international relations and had a controversial outcome, it was a significant case in preventing North Korea from illegal economic activities while also influencing the six-party talks for solving the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. Therefore, this research analyzes the BDA case based on current theories of economic sanctions. First of all, the research designs a framework of analysis by reviewing explanatory factors for the success of sanctions in three aspects: environment, design, and execution of economic sanctions. Based on the framework, it analyzes the critical factors for the success of the BDA sanctions. At the end, the BDA case satisfied several conditions for success in the aspect of designing and executing a sanction, while it fails to satisfy success conditions in regards to the aspect of environment. The sanctions were effective because the US clarified the target by identifying the economic network related to the North Korean leadership and they could reduce unnecessary collateral damages by executing financial sanctions in a short period of time. Furthermore, the US was successful in making individual financial institutions participate in the sanction by organizing an effective sanction network based on US economic hegemony and the transparency of the international financial system. Finally, the swift execution of sanction did not allow North Korea to prepare to absorb the impact of the sanctions and which in turn made the mechanism more effective.
Abstract
What are the success factors of the sanction against Banco Delta Asia (BDA)? In 2005, the US Department of Treasury sanctioned BDA for alleged money laundering related with the North Korean regime. Although the executed sanction complicated international relations and had a controversial outcome, it was a significant case in preventing North Korea from illegal economic activities while also influencing the six-party talks for solving the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. Therefore, this research analyzes the BDA case based on current theories of economic sanctions. First of all, the research designs a framework of analysis by reviewing explanatory factors for the success of sanctions in three aspects: environment, design, and execution of economic sanctions. Based on the framework, it analyzes the critical factors for the success of the BDA sanctions. At the end, the BDA case satisfied several conditions for success in the aspect of designing and executing a sanction, while it fails to satisfy success conditions in regards to the aspect of environment. The sanctions were effective because the US clarified the target by identifying the economic network related to the North Korean leadership and they could reduce unnecessary collateral damages by executing financial sanctions in a short period of time. Furthermore, the US was successful in making individual financial institutions participate in the sanction by organizing an effective sanction network based on US economic hegemony and the transparency of the international financial system. Finally, the swift execution of sanction did not allow North Korea to prepare to absorb the impact of the sanctions and which in turn made the mechanism more effective.
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