Power Transition or Peaking Power Trap in Explaining the Hegemonic Competition

Abstract

In this study we focus on the oldest IR theory that correctly predicted the current Sino-US hegemonic competition and the newest theory that suggest an imminent collision between the two superpowers. We theoretically compare Organski’s (1958) power transition theory and Brands and Beckley’s (2022) peaking power trap theory and try to empirically test key arguments of both theories. Power transition theory suggests that the key independent variables that explain the great power war are power parity between the rising challenger and the declining dominant power, and the rising challenger’s level of dissatisfaction with the existing international order. In contrast, the peaking power trap theory argues that when a rapidly rising great power, which tries to catch up with the dominant power, begins to foresee its near-future economic stagnation, and when the dominant power tries to build and strengthen its alliance system against the rising challenger, the rising power is more likely to hasten to challenge the dominant power. Results of our study indicate that power transition war is very likely when the capability of the rising challenger becomes more or less equal to that of the dominant state and that war is highly likely when the rising state is dissatisfied with the status quo. These strongly support the power transition theoretic arguments. However, these do not totally reject the peaking power trap arguments since the peaking power situation occurs when the two states are more or less equal in their national capabilities. Our study demonstrates that it is not the overtaking of power or the peaking power but the power parity situation that matters most in explaining the likelihood of the power transition war.