헌법개정론 재고(再考)－대통령과 국회의 권한배분 문제를 중심으로－
Should We Change our 1987 Constitution? : An Argument against the Proposal for Power Redistribution between President and Congress
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Should we change our 1987 Constitution? Plenty of scholars and politicians maintain the current Constitution should be revised, on the ground that the structure of government power is obsolete and should therefore be newly rearranged. The revisionists’ diagnoses are as follows. 1. The constitutional powers of the president are too strong and therefore they need to be reduced. 2. To reduce the powers of the president, the semi-presidential system should be adopted, instead of the current presidential one. 3. The powers of the current unicameral legislature should be divided into two houses and the upper house should represent regional interests. By using comparative historical research methods, I argue against the above mentioned revisionists’ diagnoses. 1. The constitutional powers of the president are not “too” strong, not only compared to the current presidents of other countries, but also compared to the past presidents of Korea. 2. The adoption of semi-presidential government, combined with the lack of party control, may lead to a constitutional dictatorship by a popularly elected president who has the power to dissolve congress. 3. The adoption of a bicameral legislature with a regionally represented upper house may cause the unequal redistribution of wealth from capital area to regional areas, together with the under-representation of youths in the capital area.
Abstract
Should we change our 1987 Constitution? Plenty of scholars and politicians maintain the current Constitution should be revised, on the ground that the structure of government power is obsolete and should therefore be newly rearranged. The revisionists’ diagnoses are as follows. 1. The constitutional powers of the president are too strong and therefore they need to be reduced. 2. To reduce the powers of the president, the semi-presidential system should be adopted, instead of the current presidential one. 3. The powers of the current unicameral legislature should be divided into two houses and the upper house should represent regional interests. By using comparative historical research methods, I argue against the above mentioned revisionists’ diagnoses. 1. The constitutional powers of the president are not “too” strong, not only compared to the current presidents of other countries, but also compared to the past presidents of Korea. 2. The adoption of semi-presidential government, combined with the lack of party control, may lead to a constitutional dictatorship by a popularly elected president who has the power to dissolve congress. 3. The adoption of a bicameral legislature with a regionally represented upper house may cause the unequal redistribution of wealth from capital area to regional areas, together with the under-representation of youths in the capital area.
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