행위와 부작위는 도덕적으로 비대칭적인가
Are Action and Omission Morally Asymmetrical?
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초록
죽임은 도덕적으로 비난받을만하지만 죽게 내버려둠은 도덕적으로 덜 비 난받는다는 것이 일반적 직관이다. 이 논문은 프랭크푸르트 스타일의 행위-부작위 간 도덕적 비대칭성 주장에 대해 세 가지 근거로 반박한다. 첫째, 비대칭성 주장은 대안가능성에 대한 결과중심적 해석을 가정하며 이 가정은 인과적 책임 논의에는 적절하나 도덕적 책임 여부에 대한 근거로 적절하지 않다. 둘째, 이 논문이 고안한 수정된 합쳐진 트롤리 시나리오에서 드러나듯 도덕적 책임의 제어조건은 인과중심 논의의 가정과 달리 인식적 요소와 밀접한 연관을 가진다. 셋째, ‘인과성’과 ‘행위- 부작위 구분’에 대한 지각은 인식상대적일 수 있다.
Abstract
Killing is morally blameworthy but letting someone die is morally less blameworthy. This paper refutes the Frankfurt-style action-omission moral asymmetry claim on three grounds. First, the argument for asymmetry assumes a result-based interpretation of alternative possibilities, and this assumption is not appropriate as a basis for moral responsibility, although causal responsibility can be guaranteed. Second, the non-alternative examples used in the claim of asymmetry still leave room for alternative possibilities, and the control condition of moral responsibility requires a cognitive component that is overlooked by the causal discussion. Third, perception of 'causality' and ‘action-omission distinction’ can be relative to perception.
참고문헌 (28)
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