비결과주의 도덕 이론에서의 죽이기와 죽게 내버려두기

Abstract

While killing an innocent person is generally prohibited, it is sometimes permissible if it is necessary to save (many) others. Killing can also be justified in cases such as euthanasia, abortion, and defensive attacks. What is called ‘the ethics of killing’ seeks to explain which acts of killing are permissible and on what grounds. Non-consequentialist theories, which hold that factors beyond mere outcomes should be considered in moral assessments, often include several morally important distinctions or principles to capture common-sense judgments and their rationales. Among these, ‘the distinction between killing and letting die’ is commonly thought to play an important role in determining the permissibility of actions. This paper argues that this distinction does not, in fact, play the explanatory role that is typically expected of it in non-consequentialist accounts of permissible killing. In section 2, an explication of such an explanatory role is provided. Section 3 shows that even when it is examined in a favorable manner, an account of permissible killing which incorporates the distinction between killing and letting die fails to be extensionally adequate. In section 4, I argue that for the distinction to play a significant explanatory role in a non-consequentialist account, it needs to be able to establish a kind of priority among conflicting duties, which is the rejectable interpretation of its importance. In conclusion, even if the distinction between killing and letting die has some moral importance, it plays a more limited role than is generally assumed by those who accept it.