주자철학에서의 자기성찰 문제에 관한 연구 - 찰식설 비판을 중심으로 -

Abstract

This study examines Zhu Xi’s critique of the Hunan school and Buddhism for their approach of splitting the mind into an observing subject and observed object in self-reflection. While self-reflection is commonly understood as requiring both a reflecting agent and a reflected object, Zhu Xi argued that the mind is unified and opposed the division of the mind into subject and object. After Zhu Xi transitioned from the old theory of Zhonghe to the new theory of Zhonghe, he engaged in debates with Hunan school scholars concerning the nature of the mind and cultivation practices. His two main criticisms were, first, that the Hunan school’s cultivation method was not suitable for daily practice, and second, that their approach divided the mind into a “reflecting mind” and a “reflected mind.” The practice of observing the mind with the mind itself was common in the past and remains relevant today, as seen in modern terms like “self-objectification” and “metacognitive ability.” These concepts imply that self-reflection requires both a subject and an object, both structurally and methodologically. Therefore, this study will summarize Zhu Xi’s turning point in his cultivation theory and analyze his criticisms of the Hunan school to clarify the issues he identified. Finally, drawing from Zhu Xi’s various commentaries, I will examine his views on reflection and introspection to conclude that his theory of self-cultivation emphasizes concreteness in daily life and addresses fundamental issues of knowledge.