차등의결권 제도의 경제학적 분석
Economic Analysis of Dual Class Stock
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초록
차등의결권 제도란 회사가 의결권 수가 서로 다른 종류의 주식을 발행할 수 있는 제도다. 차등의결권주식을 발행할 경우 지배주주나 경영진은 적은 지분율을 가지고도 회사 지배구조에 막강한 영향력을 행사할 수 있다. 이런 차등의결권 제도 도입을 반대하는 사람들은 1주 1표 원칙과 주주평등원칙에 어긋난다고 비판한다. 그러나 역사적으로 볼 때 1인 1표, 신중한 중위투표, 1주 1표 등 다양한 의결권 행사 방식이 존재했다. 최근에도 유럽이나 미국 기업들은 1주 1표가 아닌 다른 의결권 행사 방식을 채택하는 경우가 있다. 제3자가 보기에 불평등한 대우를 받는 계약처럼 보이더라도, 그것이 자발적인 계약에 의한 것이라면 거래당사자가 모두 이익을 얻는다. 그러므로 자발적인 계약에 의한 차등의결권 제도 도입은 주주평등원칙에 위배되지 않으며, 오히려 이 제도 도입을 금지하는 것은 계약자유의 원칙에 위배되며 시장의 효율성을 떨어뜨린다. 또 차등의결권으로 인해 지배주주의 사익추구 가능성을 제기하지만, 선행연구 결과들은 일관된 결론을 내리지 못하고 있다. 그리고 차등의결권 주식을 도입할 경우 주식회사들은 경영권 안정을 유지하면서 자금조달 수단을 다양화할 수 있다. 따라서 차등의결권 제도는 주주들의 선택에 의해 채택할 수 있도록 현행 상법상 강행규정인 1주 1표 원칙을 임의규정으로 개정해야 한다.
Abstract
Dual class stock is issued by a company giving different voting rights based on an investment of equal value. By issuing the dual class stock, managers can exercise control rights of corporate governance with small equity rates. Most people have regarded the principle of one share one vote as mandatory rule. But historically shareholders have exercised various voting rights, one shareholder-one vote and prudent mean vote, one share-one vote etc. Therefore One share-one vote should not be understood as dominating rule with no exceptions. If shareholders agree voluntarily the contract of issuing dual class stock, it does not infringe the principle of shareholders' equal treatments and all the parties get the benefit from the contract. The prohibition of dual class stock violates the freedom of contract and lowers the market efficiency. Therefore, shareholders must be given the choice to decide on issuance of the dual class stock.
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