한반도에서의 대반란전 수행개념 연구

Abstract

Counterinsurgency may be defined as comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. Therefore, the existence of friendly forces, groups or organizations within the area of operations is the most crucial element in determining the success and failure of the counterinsurgency activities. If operation units can remove the overarching cause purportedly championed by the insurgent elements by means of taking advantage of local friendly groups on the ground, it will be able to deal a severe blow upon the revolting people. The primary subject matter of this paper is the case study on counterinsurgency movements in Iraq War and Korean War. Especially this research aims at proposing concept of operation in the future counterinsurgency scenario on the Korean Peninsula upon the base of analysis on multi -faceted modes of operations persistently conducted by communist party members and North Korean military when the United Nations troops marched to the North beyond the 38the parallel line. At the same time, the paper attempts to distinguish between the national strategy that should be undertaken at the governmental level as well as military responses for the purpose of increasing the success likelihood in the future counterinsurgency operations. First and foremost, it is imperative that the solid integration of efforts at the government-wide dimension be put in place for safeguarding the success of counterinsurgency enterprise. This article argues to the effect that a formulation of counter-strategy at the governmental level is indispensible for the future counterinsurgency operations on the Korean peninsula.