북핵 선제타격 가능성과 TDS의 억지 충족성 평가 연구

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possibility of a nuclear preemptive strike by North Korea in the face of the growing North Korean nuclear threat, and to consider the deterrence satisfaction of the Korea-U.S. Customized Deterrence Strategy (TDS) by assuming a scenario for a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear weapons, which is the most threatening to the South Korean military. Since a nuclear preemptive strike means war, we will examine the possibility and conditions of war through the theory of the cause of war, and analyze the possibility of a preemptive strike in terms of North Korea's nuclear legislation and national goals, nuclear development objectives and capabilities, and nuclear strategies. Additionally, in order to assess the deterrence satisfaction of the TDS in response to a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear weapons, we will examine the three-axis system, which is the Korean military's independent response capability, and the limitations of the provision of extended deterrence by the United States. Through research, it was discovered that the Korea-U.S. strategy for customized deterrence lacked the integrity of responding to the North Korean nuclear threat, and three directions for response were needed to overcome it. First, by strengthening international security cooperation, we need to strengthen the traditional Korea-U.S. alliance and the Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, as well as security cooperation with neighboring countries, to create a friendly international environment in which North Korea cannot decide to go to war. Second, by changing the paradigm for responding to North Korea's nuclear weapons, it is a way to turn the crisis brought on by North Korea's nuclear weapons into an opportunity to strengthen its security capabilities through independent nuclear development under the NPT consultation or policies toward a system that shares the United States' nuclear weapons. Third, the government should demand fundamental countermeasures so that the people can change government policy by forming public opinion rather than leaving the response to the North Korean nuclear threat to the government and the military by strengthening public security behavior.