모바일페이사와 신용카드사의 경쟁
Competition between Mobile Pay and Credit Card Systems
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This paper illustrates the competition between the mobile pay and credit card systems byutilizing the theory of two-sided markets. Two firms, as platforms, maximize the profitcollecting fees from consumers on one side and from retailers on the other side. Consumerspay to buy goods and services with mobile pay, credit card, or cash. The basic model is onethat each platform maximizes its profit. We show that the fees for credit card holders andretailers are higher than the respective costs. The fee for retailers of the mobile payment ishigher than its cost, while the buyer’s fee may be higher or lower than its cost. Appliedmodel is the one that employs the delegation game model. The total profit of the mobile paysystem is composed of its profit and the weighted demand for the mobile pay. It is shown thatbuyers’ fee under the applied model is lower than that under the basic model, resulting in anincrease of the demand for the mobile pay. The fee for the retailers rises, albeit the sum offees for the buyers and retailers falls. The profit for the mobile pay system is increased, whilethat for the credit card company stays the same.
Abstract
This paper illustrates the competition between the mobile pay and credit card systems byutilizing the theory of two-sided markets. Two firms, as platforms, maximize the profitcollecting fees from consumers on one side and from retailers on the other side. Consumerspay to buy goods and services with mobile pay, credit card, or cash. The basic model is onethat each platform maximizes its profit. We show that the fees for credit card holders andretailers are higher than the respective costs. The fee for retailers of the mobile payment ishigher than its cost, while the buyer’s fee may be higher or lower than its cost. Appliedmodel is the one that employs the delegation game model. The total profit of the mobile paysystem is composed of its profit and the weighted demand for the mobile pay. It is shown thatbuyers’ fee under the applied model is lower than that under the basic model, resulting in anincrease of the demand for the mobile pay. The fee for the retailers rises, albeit the sum offees for the buyers and retailers falls. The profit for the mobile pay system is increased, whilethat for the credit card company stays the same.
참고문헌 (19)
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