메를로-퐁티의 철학과 체화된 인지 이론의 관련성

Abstract

As a branch of the theory of embodied cognition, enactive cognition theory aims to overcome ‘explanatory gap’ between objective science and subjective experience. ‘Reduction’ is a method unique to phenomenology aiming to “naturalize phenomenology”. Reduction is defined as the ‘epoche’ of ‘natural attitudes’ through which Merleau-Ponty criticizes the constitution of transcendental consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology. In his view, this mode of reduction is susceptible to criticism and will neglect the ‘phenomenal character of experience.’ To reveal the phenomenality of the world, Merleau-Ponty implements reduction to a ‘phenomenal field’ as the ultimate source from which all phenomena arise. This reduction opens a more fundamental dimension that can never be reduced to either objective science or subjective experience, and it is here that we find the commonality between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and enactive cognition theory. Furthermore, naturalization of phenomenology and reduction in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology may be possible due to the duality of the body in connivance with the world. Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl’s distinction between the ‘objective body(Körper)’ viewed from a third-person perspective, and the ‘subjective body(Leib),’ from a first-person perspective. Enactive cognition theory interprets the duality of the body as the duality of ‘embodiment’, and attempts to achieve naturalization of phenomenology through embodiment, where subjectivity and objectivity appear simultaneously. Next, to investigate the relevance of embodied cognition theory to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, we compare ‘life’ as an ‘autopoietic’ entity that autonomously interacts with the world through ‘sense-making’, with ‘the corporeal and motor intentionality’ that are established in the realm of action rather than consciousness in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. Finally, we contrast Merleau-Ponty's ‘being in the world’ with enactive cognitive theory, which suggests that living things exist in dynamic interaction with its environment, forming the ‘structural coupling.’ In doing so, we hope to foster a reciprocal understanding between the theory of embodied cognition and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.