신체와 신체화. 그 차이의 동기로서의 살

Abstract

From a phenomenological perspective, the philosophical importance of Merleau-Ponty lies in the fact that he paved the way for the philosophy of the concrete through perceptual sense rather than abstract theory. The central concept that made this philosophy of the concrete possible is the “body.” For Merleau-Ponty the body is a background in which concrete meaning is created and at the same time a possibility that allows the transformation of meaning. However, the concept of body can only be apprehended as a fixed structure of meaning because it is always a bearer of perceptual meaning, even if it is endowed with the powers of both subjectivity and objectivity. Recognizing the limits of this concept of body, Merleau-Ponty opened an ontological path through the concept of “flesh” as going beyond. He could claim the ontology of the flesh because he believed in the qualitative homogeneity of the flesh and the body. Paradoxically, however, flesh and body are opposed rather than homogenized in the structure of meaning. It is as though the body has no choice but to take on the structure of a static meaning, whereas the flesh can always only be considered as a motif of a generating scenario. The present article constitutes an attempt to understand the relationship between the body and the flesh from the formation of meaning. Moreover, from the perspective of this article the body is the crystallization of the meaning of the flesh, and the meaning of the flesh is the motif of embodiment of the meaning. Only when this distinction is clear can external objects be grasped as their own bodies, and only to that extent is Merleau-Ponty’s carnal ontology complete.