지각 경험의 하위단계와 비개념적 내용
Subpersonal States and Non-conceptual Content
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초록
지각 경험에 관한 개념주의를 주장하는 맥도웰과 브루어와 같은 철학자들에 따르면 우리의 지각 경험이 전적으로 개념적 내용을 갖게 되는 이유는 바로 지각 경험이 우리가 갖는 크게 세 가지 유형의 개념적 능력과 조우하기 때문이라고 주장한다. 따라서 이들에게 있어 지각 경험이란 의식적 상태이며 우리의 개념적 능력의 접근을 허락하는 이른바 심적 상태의 상위단계(personal level of mental state)로 정의된다. 반면, 신경철학자들로 일컬어지는 라프토폴루스(Raftopoulos)와 뮐러 (Müller) Raftopoulos, A. & Műller, C., “The Phenomenal Content of Experience”. Mind and Language, 21(2), (April), 2006; Raftopoulos, A., Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neuroscience Inform Philosophy?, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. 는 경험의 내용이 인지적 침투(cognitive penetration)를 허락하는 하에서는 개념적 내용을 갖지만 그렇지 않은 경우에는 비개념적 내용을 갖는다고 주장한다. 따라서 이들에게 있어 경험이란 때로 우리의 인지적 침투의 접근을 허용할 경우와 그렇지 않은 경우 모두를 포함하며, 개념적 내용과 비개념적 내용을 구분하는 기준은 내용을 갖는 경험이 인지적으로 침투되었는지(cognitively penetrated) 그렇지 않은지의 여부이다. 이 논문은 신경 철학자들의 입장을 검토하면서, 비개념주의자들이 경험의 비개념적 표상의 내용은 오로지 ‘비의식적 경험 안에서의 내용만을 의미한다’라는 주장을 펼친다 할지라도 그러한 내용의 존재 여부는 높은 차원의 인지적, 개념적 개입에 의해서만 이루어질 수 있고 이는 지각 경험이 개념적 내용을 갖는 것을 증명한다는 것을 논증한다.
Abstract
Philosophers, who advocate conceptualism on perceptual experience, particularly John McDowell and Bill Brewer, have argued that perceptual experience has conceptual contents because those contents could be engaged with the three major types of conceptual capacities that we have. As such, the notion of experience that the conceptualists hold is conscious state, which allows our conscious access involving the conceptual capacities. Whereas, philosophers called neuro-philosophers, particularly Raftopoulos and Müller recently argue that the contents of experience can be non-conceptual only if they are not cognitively penetrated, otherwise it is conceptual. Hence, the range of experience defined by the neuro-philosophers refers to both conscious and non-conscious states of mind. As such the criterion of having either conceptual contents or non-conceptual contents is dependent on whether a perceptual state is cognitively penetrated. This paper reveals the initial problem of the non-conceptualism that there is no way to prove the existence of non-conceptual content in subpersonal mental states without considering conceptual cognitive penetration. Non-conceptualists attempt to find that there could be a particular type of perceptual content, which cannot be engaged with a perceiver's conceptual capacity when we consider only subpersonal level of experience in order to prove the existence of non-conceptual content in experience. However, I argue that without being conceptually engaged with, no perceptual content can be found in those lower level of experience.
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