개념의 운동으로서 변증법과 현실 세계

Abstract

The main goal of this article is to propose an interpretation of Hegel’sdialectic. The first section deals with the basic principles of Hegel’s philosophycalled the philosophy of objective idealism. In this section, I also explain whyone should think that the dialectical method, or the dialectical logic, plays acentral role in the system of his objective idealism. The second section dealswith more specific aspects of Hegel’s theory of dialectic and contradiction itargues that the contradiction—which is the generating force in the dialecticalmovement of different concepts— should be interpreted as pragmaticcontradiction. Furthermore, I suggest that the pragmatic contradiction lies in theschism between the statement made and what is presupposed in the act ofmaking this statement. Therefore, it is argued that Hegel’s dialectical logic doesnot violate the rules of formal logic such as the law of contradiction. Finally,some limits of the system of Hegel’s objective idealism are discussed. Inparticular, I discuss the relation between Hegel’s objective idealism and thecategory of intersubjectivity, which is most overarching and dominant categoryof post-Hegelian philosophy. In other words, it is stressed that one of the crucial limits in the Hegeliansystem is closely interrelated with the fact that Hegel did not introduce thecategory of intersubjectivity into his philosophical system, and absolutesubjectivity—as the union of subjectivity and objectivity—plays a crucial, indeedcentral, role in Hegel’s philosophy. Therefore, it is suggested that it is worthnoting a new form of objective idealism, developed by R. Brandom and V. Hösle, who have attempted to overcome the limits of Hegel’s objective idealismthrough the introduction of the post-Hegelian concept of intersubjectivity.