Aurelian’s Military Reforms and the Power Dynamics of the Near East
0
조회
0
다운로드
2
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This study seeks to provide a new understanding and explanation of how the Roman emperor Aurelian managed to regain and re-establish control over the eastern provinces of the Empire during the short period of his reign, 270-275 CE. My primary focus is on his military reforms. Previously, these reforms have been considered a mere continuation of Gallienus’ policies with few new initiatives. Gallienus’ creation of the mobile field army, combining infantry with cavalry, was originally an ad hoc measure to enhance manoeuvrability and allow the Roman army to confront the Carpi, the Danubian Goths, and the Black Sea Goths simultaneously, and to contain Postumus’ Gallic Empire. I argue that Aurelian modified and reformed this mobile field army to suit his campaigns in the eastern provinces. My secondary focus is on understanding the details of the relations and rivalries between the dominant imperial powers in the Near East. In this period being examined, the territory where Rome and Sassanid Persia competed became the arena of a struggle which grew to involve other regional powers. These included the oasis state of Palmyra and also the Kingdom of Armenia whose existence seems to have been ignored by scholars because of the Persian occupation there which was then followed by an interregnum from 252 to 279. In terms of Aurelian’s military reforms, the Roman emperor innovatively increased the number of heavy-armed mailed cavalry, while Gallienus restructured his army into a cavalry-centric mobile field army. For Aurelian’s Palmyrene campaign the offensive capability and manoeuvrability of his expeditionary force were paramount because he had to give the Sassanid Persia no room to intervene in his war. Other than the legions, Aurelian also extensively employed the equites, the Roman cataphractarii, and the eastern ethnic clibanarii and cavalry archers. Although the power dynamics of the Near East were unfavourable to him and prevented him from recruiting heavy-armed cavalrymen from the usual areas, he was able to draw on the refugees of the Arsacid Armenians and Parthians to compensate. The employment of the Armenian and Parthian units, clibanarii and mounted archers, was a crucial factor to Aurelian’s success in the Near East. Thanks to the manoeuvrability and tactical superiority of the heavy cavalry units, Aurelian managed to quickly reclaim the eastern provinces from Zenobia’s control.
Abstract
This study seeks to provide a new understanding and explanation of how the Roman emperor Aurelian managed to regain and re-establish control over the eastern provinces of the Empire during the short period of his reign, 270-275 CE. My primary focus is on his military reforms. Previously, these reforms have been considered a mere continuation of Gallienus’ policies with few new initiatives. Gallienus’ creation of the mobile field army, combining infantry with cavalry, was originally an ad hoc measure to enhance manoeuvrability and allow the Roman army to confront the Carpi, the Danubian Goths, and the Black Sea Goths simultaneously, and to contain Postumus’ Gallic Empire. I argue that Aurelian modified and reformed this mobile field army to suit his campaigns in the eastern provinces. My secondary focus is on understanding the details of the relations and rivalries between the dominant imperial powers in the Near East. In this period being examined, the territory where Rome and Sassanid Persia competed became the arena of a struggle which grew to involve other regional powers. These included the oasis state of Palmyra and also the Kingdom of Armenia whose existence seems to have been ignored by scholars because of the Persian occupation there which was then followed by an interregnum from 252 to 279. In terms of Aurelian’s military reforms, the Roman emperor innovatively increased the number of heavy-armed mailed cavalry, while Gallienus restructured his army into a cavalry-centric mobile field army. For Aurelian’s Palmyrene campaign the offensive capability and manoeuvrability of his expeditionary force were paramount because he had to give the Sassanid Persia no room to intervene in his war. Other than the legions, Aurelian also extensively employed the equites, the Roman cataphractarii, and the eastern ethnic clibanarii and cavalry archers. Although the power dynamics of the Near East were unfavourable to him and prevented him from recruiting heavy-armed cavalrymen from the usual areas, he was able to draw on the refugees of the Arsacid Armenians and Parthians to compensate. The employment of the Armenian and Parthian units, clibanarii and mounted archers, was a crucial factor to Aurelian’s success in the Near East. Thanks to the manoeuvrability and tactical superiority of the heavy cavalry units, Aurelian managed to quickly reclaim the eastern provinces from Zenobia’s control.
참고문헌 (57)
- Alston, R, "Roman military pay from Caesar to Diocletian", JRS, 84, pp.113~123 (1994)
- Banchich T. M., "History of Zonaras: From Alexander Severus to the Death of Theodosius the Great" (2009)
- Bivar, A. D. H., "The political history of Iran under the Arsacids", CHI, 3(1), pp.21~99 (1983)
- Blois, L. de, "The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus" (1976)
- Blois, L. de, "Deleto Paene Imperio Romano:Transformationsprozesse des Römischen Reiches im 3. Jahrhundert und ihre Rezeption in der Neuzeit", pp.25~36 (2006)
- Bowman, A, "Egypt from Septimius Severus to the death of Constantine", CAH, 12, pp.313~326 (2005)
- Butcher, K., "Roman Syria and the Near East" (2003)
- Campbell, B., "The army", CAH, 12, pp.110~130 (2005)
- Chahin, M., "The Kingdom of Armenia" (1987)
- Chaumont, M. L., "L’Arménie entre Rome et l’Iran I: de l’avènement d’Auguste à l’avènement de Dioclétian", ANRW 2, 9(1), pp.71~194 (1976)
- Colledge, M. A. R., "The Parthians" (1967)
- Drinkwater, J, "Maximinus to Diocletian and the ʻcrisis’", CAH, 12, pp.28~66 (2005)
- Dodgeon, M. H., "The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars, A.D. 226-363: A Documentary History" (1991)
- Eadie, J. W, "The development of Roman mailed cavalry", JRS, 57, pp.161~173 (1967)
- Edwell, P. M., "Between Rome and Persia: The Middle Euphrates, Mesopotamia and Palmyra under Roman Control" (2008)
- Frye, R. N., "The political history of Iran under the Sasanians", CHI, 3(1), pp.116~180 (1983)
- Frye, R. N., "The History of Ancient Iran" (1984)
- Frye, R. N., "The Sassanians", CAH, 12, pp.461~480 (2005)
- Geiger, M., "Gallienus" (2013)
- Grant, M., "The Collapse and Recovery of the Roman Empire" (1999)
- Hekster, O., "Rome and its Empire, AD 193-284" (2008)
- Hovannisian, R. G., "The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times. Vol. 1, The Dynastic Periods: From Antiquity to the Fourteenth Century" (1997)
- Isaac, B, "The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East" (1992)
- Jacob, P., "Aurelians Reformen in Politik und Rechtsentwicklung" (2004)
- Kettenhofen, E., "Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia", pp.151~171 (1983)
- Lang, D. M., "Iran, Armenia and Georgia", CHI, 3(1), pp.505~536 (1983)
- Le Bohec, Y., "The Imperial Roman Army" (2000)
- Le Bohec, Y., "The Encyclopedia of the Roman Army" (2015)
- Lightfoot, C. S, "Armenia and the eastern marches", CAH, 12, pp.481~497 (2005)
- Lo Cascio, E, "The government and administration of the empire in the central decades of the third century", CAH, 12, pp.156~169 (2005)
- MacMullen, R., "Roman Government’s Response to Crisis, A.D. 235-337" (1976)
- Mennen, I., "Power and Status in the Roman Empire, AD 193-284" (2011)
- Millar, F., "P. Herennius Dexippus: the Greek world and the third-century invasions", JRS, 59, pp.12~29 (1969)
- Millar, F., "Paul of Samosata, Zenobia and Aurelian: the church, local culture and political allegiance in third-century Syria", JRS, 61, pp.1~17 (1971)
- Millar, F., "The Roman Near East, 31 B.C.-A.D. 337" (1993)
- Mitchell, S., "Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia" (1983)
- Nakamura, B., "Palmyra and the Roman east", Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34(2), pp.133~150 (1993)
- Panossian, R., "The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars" (2006)
- Peachin, M., "Roman Imperial Titulature and Chronology, A.D. 235-284" (1990)
- Potter, D. S, "Rome and Palmyra: Odaenathus’ titulature and the use of the imperium maius", ZPE, 113, pp.271~285 (1995)
- Potter, D. S., "The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180-395" (2014)
- Raditsa, L., "Iranians in Asia Minor", CHI, 3(1), pp.100~115 (1983)
- Rathbone, D. W, "The dates of the recognition in Egypt of the emperors from Caracalla to Diocletianus", ZPE, 62, pp.101~131 (1986)
- Redgate, A. E., "The Armenians" (1998)
- Saunders, R. T., "A Biography of the Emperor Aurelian (A.D. 270-275)", PhD, pp.1991
- Scarborough, J., "Aurelian, questions and problems", Classical Journal, 68, pp.334~345 (1972)
- Smith, A. M., "Roman Palmyra: Identity, Community, and State Formation" (2013)
- Speidel, M. P., "The rise of ethnic units in the Roman imperial army", ANRW II, 2, pp.202~231 (1975)
- Sprengling, M., "Third Century Iran: Sapor and Katir" (1953)
- Stoneman, R., "Palmyra and its Empire: Zenobia’s Revolt against Rome" (1992)
- Thomson, R. W., "Agathangelos: History of the Armenians" (1976)
- Thomson, R. W., "Moses Khorenatsʻi: History of the Armenians" (1978)
- Toumanoff, C., "The third-century Armenian Arsacids: a chronological and genealogical commentary", Revue des Études Arméniennes, 6, pp.233~281 (1969)
- Watson, A., "Aurelian and the Third Century" (1999)
- Whitby, M., "Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire" (2004)
- White, J. F., "The Roman Emperor Aurelian: Restorer of the World" (2015)
- Winsbury, R., "Zenobia of Palmyra: History, Myth and the Neo-Classical Imagination" (2010)