경영자소유지분이 부채만기와 대리인비용에 미치는 영향

Abstract

This study extends Data et al.’s (2005) study by rigorously examining the relation between managerial stock ownership and corporate debt maturity decisions. Datta et al. (205) reason that as managerial ownership declines, there will be less alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. They also reason that, in this situation, managers choose a smaller proportion of short-term debt since issuing short-term debt leads to frequent monitoring from stakeholders. In their study, Datta et al. (2005) show that the higher the managerial ownership, the larger the proportion of short-term debt. This study hypothesizes that the impact of managerial ownership on corporate debt maturity varies between agent-led and owner- controlled firms. Specifically, we test whether, for agent-led firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interests with shareholders increases, increasing the proportion of short-term debt. In contrast, we also test whether, for owner-controlled firms, there is an inverse relation between managerial ownership and the proportion of short-term debt. This study contributes to the literature on corporate debt maturity from the perspective of ownership structure. This study also extends Datta et al.’s (2005) study by reexamining the relation between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity in the different types of ownership structure. This study also hypothesizes that the impact of managerial ownership on agency costs varies between agent-led and owner- controlled firms. We predict that, for agent-led firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders due to a larger proportion of short-term debt increases, decreasing agency costs. In contrast, we predict that, for owner-controlled firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders due to a smaller proportion of short-term debt become lower, increasing agency costs. Datta et al. (2005) argue that as managerial ownership increases, managers choose the larger proportion of short-term debt, thereby increasing an alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders. They do not, however, provide evidence on the relation between managerial ownership and agency costs. Furthermore, we complement Datta et al.’s (2005) study by considering agency costs in the determination of corporate debt maturity. Using the sample of non-financial firms listed on the Korean Exchanges (KRX) between 2005 and 2011, this study examines the relation between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity. Specifically, this study investigates the role of managerial ownership in the debt maturity decisions using a pooled OLS regression controlling for leverage, asset maturity, growth opportunities, the investment-grade dummy, abnormal earnings, stock volatility, firm size, and regulation industry dummy. For the entire sample firms, we find an insignificant relation between managerial ownership and the proportion of short-term debt. We also find that, for the subsample of owner-controlled firms, managerial ownership is insignificantly related to the proportion of short-term debt, while, for the subsample of agent-led firms, the relation is a positive and significant. Notably, for the subsample of agent-led firms, the proportion of short-term debt increases by about 8.48% as managerial ownership increase from median to 95 percentile. The increased managerial ownership is not only important statistically, but has also economical significance. Furthermore, regarding the relation between managerial ownership and agency costs, we find consistent results with previous findings. This study uses the inverse of expense ratios and asset turnover ratios as proxy for agency costs. We expect that if managerial ownership increases and thus agency costs declines, the coefficient on managerial ownership will be negative. In regression models using the entire sample firms, we find that as managerial ownership becomes higher, agency costs increase. For the subsample of owner-controlled firms, there is a positive and significant relation between managerial ownership and expense ratios. In contrast, for the subsample of agent-led firms, we find a negative and significant relation between managerial ownership and expense ratios, indicating that as managerial ownership increases, agency costs decline. In addition, the results of regressions using the inverse of asset turnover ratios are consistent with previous findings.