본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

간접보상을 통한 경영자의 사익추구:대주주 지배력과 경영진 규율장치의 역할

Indirect Compensation as a Tunnel for Executives' Perquisite Consumption: The Role of Large Shareholders and Disciplinary Systems

0

조회

0

다운로드

20

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

주제분류경영학

초록

본 연구는 경영자 보상 가운데 한국기업에서 직접보상에 비해 대리인 비용이 반영될 여지가 큰 간접보상에 대해 대주주 지배력이 영향력을 미치는 지 검증하고, 그러한 대리인 비용이 외국인투자자의 견제, 이사회의 독립성, 성과연동 보상, 감사위원회 중 어떠한 규율장치가 설치된 상황에서 보다 효과적으로 줄어들 수 있는지에 대해 검증했다. 실증분석 결과, 대주주 지분율이 높고 대주주가 경영에 참여할수록 경영진에 대한 간접보상이 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 대주주 지분율 및 대주주 경영참여와 경영진 간접보상 사이의 부(-)적인 관계는 외국인투자자의 견제와 성과연동 보상체계에 의해 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 대주주 지분율이 높고 대주주가 이사회를 통해 경영에 참여할수록, 주주와 경영진의 이해를 일치시켜주고 경영진의 기회주의적 행동을 보다 효과적으로 감시함으로써 전체 경영진이 기업가치를 극대화하는 방향으로 의사결정할 수 있도록 유도한다는 것을 의미한다. 또 외환위기 이후 글로벌 스탠더드에 대한 요구에 부응하기 위해 생겨난 정부 규제에 의한 강제적 규율장치보다는, 감시 동기와 역량을 갖춘 외국인투자자의 영향력 확대나 경영자의 자발적 통제를 유도하는 성과연동 보상이 대리인 문제를 더 효과적으로 완화시킨다고 볼 수 있다.

Abstract

This study examines the effect of large shareholder's controlling power – measured by the largest shareholder’s stockholdings and management participation – on executive managers’ indirect compensation. The results show that the largest shareholder’s stockholdings and management participation significantly reduce executives’ indirect compensation. Also shown are negative, moderating effects of the foreign ownership and the pay for performance on the relationships between the largest shareholders’ controlling power and executives’ indirect compensation. Such results imply that executives in Korean firms tend to pursue private interest through perquisite consumption, assuming it as indirect compensation. In addition, compared to regulations imposed by the government, foreign investors, who tend to have motivations and capabilities to monitor companies, as well as performance-related compensation schemes, which lead executives' voluntary control, appear to have more positive effect on constraining executives’ perquisite consumption.

참고문헌 (69)

  1. 고광수, "외국인 거래 정보와 주식시장: 개방 10년의 경험", 재무연구, 16(1), pp.159~192 (2003)
  2. 김경묵, "기업 지배구조와 혁신: 소유구조가 연구개발(R&D) 투자에 미치는 영향", 경영학연구, 32(6), pp.1799~1832 (2003)
  3. 김경묵, "기업 지배구조의 합주(Orchestration): 균형성과표(Balanced Scorecard) 개념 적용을 통한 기업 지배구조의 성과 분석", 경영학연구, 35(3), pp.899~934 (2006), 한국경영학회
  4. 박정윤, "윤리성 변수를 이용한 기업부실예측: 접대비 및 복리후생비를 중심으로", 경영학연구, 32(2), pp.499~522 (2003)
  5. 박헌준, "한국기업의 대리인 비용과 기업가치: 외국인 지분의 역할", 경영학연구, 33(2), pp.655~682 (2004)
  6. 신준용, "소유구조 및 임금구조 관점에서 본 대리인 비용과 기업가치에 관한 연구", 한국관리회계학회 하계학술발표회, pp.51~79 (2002)
  7. 이경태, "경영자에 대한 스톡옵션 보상이 주가변동성에 미치는 영향", 경영학연구, 34(1), pp.57~84 (2005)
  8. 이태호, "기업 접대비의 생산성에 관한 연구", 회계정보연구, 23(2), pp.25~50 (2005)
  9. 최병규, "회사임원배상보험", 보험학회지, 54, pp.21~45 (1999)
  10. Abrahamson, E., "Concealment of negative organizational outcomes: An agency theory perspective", Academy of Management Journal, 37, pp.1302~1334 (1994)
  11. Beasley, M.S., "An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud", Accounting Review, 71, pp.443~465 (1996)
  12. Baysinger, B., "The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy", Academy of Management Review, 15, pp.72~87 (1990)
  13. Bebchuk, L.A., "Executive compensation as an agency problem", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, pp.71~92 (2003)
  14. Bebchuk, L.A., "Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation", University of Chicago Law Review, 69, pp.751~845 (2002)
  15. Berle, A.A., "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" (1932), Macmillan
  16. Bethel, J.E., "The effects of ownership structure on corporate restructuring", Strategic Management Journal, 14, pp.15~31 (1993)
  17. Bishop, J., "The Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: Indemnification and Insurance" (1992), Clark Boardman Callaghan
  18. Boeker, W., "Power and Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the top", Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, pp.400~421 (1992)
  19. Boyd, B.K., "Board control and CEO compensation", Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp.335~344 (1994)
  20. Chalmers, J.M.R., "Managerial opportunism? : Evidence from directors' and officers' insurance purchases", Journal of Finance, 57, pp.609~636 (2002)
  21. Chhibber, P.K., "Foreign ownership and profitability: Property rights, control, and the performance of firms in Indian industry", Journal of Law and Economics, 42, pp.209~238 (1999)
  22. Coff, R., "Bidding wars over R&D-intensive firms: Knowledge, opportunism, and the market for corporate control", Academy of Management Journal, 46, pp.74~85 (2003)
  23. Cronqvist, H., "Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, pp.695~719 (2003)
  24. Coughlan, A.T., "Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance,” An empirical investigation", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, pp.43~66 (1985)
  25. David, P., "The effect of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation", Academy of Management Journal, 41, pp.200~208 (1998)
  26. Demsetz, H., "The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.375~390 (1983)
  27. Douglas, E.J., "Incentive contracts and stockholder monitoring: substitute sources of executive compliance", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 30, pp.24~31 (1990)
  28. Fama, E.F., "Agency problems and the theory of the firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88, pp.288~307 (1980)
  29. Fama, E.F., "Separation of ownership and control", Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.301~325 (1983)
  30. Gedajlovic, E.R., "Management and ownership effects: Evidence from five Countries", Strategic Management Journal, 19, pp.533~553 (1998)
  31. Douma, S., "Foreign and domestic ownership, business groups, and firm performance: Evidence from a large emerging market", Strategic Management Journal, 27(7), pp.637~657 (2006)
  32. Gibbs, P.A., "Determinants of corporate restructuring: The relative importance of corporate governance, takeover threat, and free cash flow", Strategic Management Journal, 14, pp.51~68 (1993)
  33. Grossman, S.J., "Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation", Bell Journal of Economics, 11, pp.42~64 (1980)
  34. Hanlon, M., "Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?", Journal of Accounting & Economics, 36, pp.3~43 (2003)
  35. Haubrich, J.G., "Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem", Journal of Political Economy, 102, pp.258~276 (1994)
  36. Hill, C.W., "External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in research-intensive industries", Strategic Management Journal, 9, pp.577~590 (1988)
  37. Holderness, C.G., "Liability insurers as corporate monitors", International Review of Law & Economics, 10, pp.115~130 (1990)
  38. Hofstede, G., "The cultural relativity of organizational practice and theories", Journal of International Business Studies, 14, pp.75~89 (1983)
  39. Jensen, M.C., "Performance pay and top-management incentives", Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp.225~264 (1990)
  40. Jensen, M.C., "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency cost, and ownership structure", Journal of Financial Economics, pp.343~351 (1976)
  41. Johnson, R.A., "Board of director involvement in restructuring: The effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics", Strategic Management Journal, 14, pp.33~50 (1993)
  42. Kassinis, G., "Corporate boards and outside stakeholders as determinants of environmental litigation", Strategic Management Journal, 23, pp.399~414 (2002)
  43. Khanna, T., "Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business", Journal of Finance, 55, pp.867~891 (2000)
  44. Kochhar, R., "Explaining firm capital structure: The role of agency theory vs, transaction cost economics", Strategic Management Journal, 17, pp.713~728 (1996)
  45. Lambert, R., "The structure of organizational incentives", Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, pp.438~461 (1993)
  46. Lee, P.M., "Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S, and Japanese firms: Agency and stewardship perspectives", Academy of Management Journal, 46, pp.212~225 (2003)
  47. McConnell, J., "Equity ownership and the two faces of debt", Journal of Financial Economics, 39, pp.131~157 (1995)
  48. McGuire, J.W., "Executive incomes, sales and profits", American Economic Review, 52, pp.753~761 (1962)
  49. McMullen, D.A., "Audit committee per formance: An investigation of the consequences associated with audit committees", Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 15, pp.87~103 (1996)
  50. Morck, R., "Banks and corporate control in Japan", Journal of Finance, 54, pp.319~339 (1999)
  51. Murphy, K.J., "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration An Empirical Analysis", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, pp.11~42 (1985)
  52. Pasban, M.R., "The protection of corporate directors in England and the U.S", Anglo-American Law, 26, pp.461~492 (1997)
  53. Pavlik, E., "Executive compensation: Issues and research", Journal of Accounting Literature, 12, pp.131~89 (1993)
  54. Pfeffer, J., "Power in Organizations" (1981), Pitman
  55. Ramaswamy, K., "Variations in ownership behavior and propensity to diversity: A study of the Indian corporate context", Strategic Management Journal, 23, pp.345~358 (2002)
  56. Santerre, R.E., "Stock dispersion and executive compensation", Review of Economics and Statistics, 68, pp.685~687 (1986)
  57. Shleifer, A., "Large shareholders and corporate control", Journal of Political Economy, 94, pp.461~488 (1986)
  58. Schoonhoven, C.B., "Problems with contingency theory: Testing assumptions hidden within the language of contingency theory", Administrative Science Quarterly, 26, pp.49~377 (1981)
  59. Sundaramurthy, C., "Board structure, antitakeover provisions, and stockholder wealth", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.231~245 (1997)
  60. Thomsen, S., "Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies", Strategic Management Journal, 2, pp.689~705 (2000)
  61. Tihanyi, L., "institutional ownership differences and international diversification: The effects of boards of directors and technological opportunity", Academy of Management Journal, 46, pp.195~211 (2003)
  62. Tosi, H.L., Jr, "The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory perspective", Administrative Science Quarterly, 34, pp.169~189 (1989)
  63. Walsh, J.P., "On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms", Academy of Management Review, 15, pp.421~458 (1990)
  64. Weisbach, M.S., "Outside directors and CEO turnover", Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.431~460 (1988)
  65. Yafeh, Y., "Large share holders and banks: Who monitors and how?", Economic Journal, 113, pp.128~146 (2003)
  66. Yeh, Y.H., "Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition", Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, pp.1857~1885 (2005)
  67. Young, M., "Governing the corporation in emerging economies: A principal-principal agency perspective", Best Paper Proceedings of the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado (2002)
  68. Zahra, S.A., "Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model", Journal of Management, 15, pp.291~334 (1989)
  69. Zajac, E.J., "CEO selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis", Strategic Management Journal, 11, pp.217~230 (1990)

관련 논문AI추천

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (3건)