이사회구조 및 기업집단의 그룹본부가 경영자보상에 미치는 영향
The Impact of Board Structure and Group Headquarter on Executive Compensation
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초록
본 연구는 경영자를 평가하는 주체로서 이사회 내의 사외이사뿐만 아니라 우리나라의 대규모기업집단에서 사실상의 이사회 역할을 수행하고 있는 그룹본부가 경영자보상에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 연구 결과, 사외이사비율이 높을수록 경영자보상 수준이 낮음을 발견하였다. 또한, 사외이사비율과 성과연동 경영자보상 간의 관계가 존재하지 않았으나, 대규모기업집단소속기업에서 경영자보상수준의 변화분이 경영성과에 더 민감하게 반응함을 발견하였다. 본 연구의 결과는 대규모기업집단의 그룹본부가 관계회사의 최고경영진에 대한 평가와 보상을 결정하는 사실상의 이사회 기능 (board in fact)을 수행하고 있음을 시사한다. 본 연구의 결과는 사외이사제도가 아직 정착되지 않은 우리나라에서 대규모기업집단의 그룹본부가 대체적인 감시자 역할 (alternative monitoring role)을 수행할 수 있음을 의미한다.
Abstract
In this paper, we examine how outside director and group headquarter affect executive compensation. We find that the higher the percentage of outside director the lower the level of executive compensation. Also, we find that the percentage of outside director is not related to the performance sensitivity of executive compensation. However, result shows that executive compensation in business group affiliated firm is more sensitive to firm performance. Our finding suggests that group headquarter is performing the role of de facto board in evaluating and compensating group affiliated executives. When outside director system is not effectively implemented, as is the case in Korea, group headquarter can play the alternative monitoring role.
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