기원전 49년 카이사르의 로마내전 발발시 폼페이우스 대응의 문제

Abstract

The development of ‘Roman Civil War’ concerning the Rubicon-Crossing of Caesar is put on the middle point for my discussion. The Rubicon accident was the very significant decision in that the future of the Roman Republic was influenced very much. The main focus is now given on how the reactions of Pompeius was so weak and unready for the war despite the high possibility of its outbreak. The thesis will analyze the aspects of Pompeius’ first counterpolicy in the beginning phase of the war on the basis of several modern studies by reviewing three points: The problem of the defense of Pompeius, successful leading ability of Caesar, and the troublesome communicative deficiency between Pompeius and his colleagues as Roman leaders. Although general preference to defensive strategy of Pompeius is also acceptable in military strategy the main opinion of the thesis is that Pompeius was little ready to the attack from Caesar. The persuasive interpretation on the fact that he was defensive in one side and pursued by his enemy constantly can be found in both aspects: The Roman political colleagues of him have not shared with him not so enough, and the both parties, Pompeius and they, were not united in keeping the war under their cooperation. It signifies a possible rupture in their relationship. In other words we need to consider not only the aspect of individual ability of Pompeius himself but also the cooperative practice between the both parties, moreover their unharmonious opinions too.